Welcome to Miscellanea — by Helena Lewandowski

HI I'M HELENA AND THIS IS MY WEBSITE
a public archive for thoughts, observations, works, readings, and anything else worth keeping.

probably the easiest way to navigate this website is to go to the archive and click whatever post piques your interest. the home page is chronological, though, and can be scrolled through like a personal journal. ORRRR hit and let it throw you into a random post!

✧ ABOUT ✧

i'm helena. i study astronomy, physics, and philosophy in boston. sometimes those things end up here. so do other things.

06 Nov 2026

why i think that juilliard is the hardest school to get into

i think juilliard is the hardest school to get into. harder than harvard, and probably harder than just about anywhere else. i know that harvard has a lower acceptance rate and i don’t care. consider the difference between writing a college application essay and auditioning for a conservatory. you can spend months on an essay. you can rewrite an entire paragraph at three in the morning, decide you hate it, and change it again the next afternoon. somebody can read it over for you. tutors!!!! you can see what you've written and tweak it to perfection before anybody else has to judge it!

you can practice for a juilliard audition for YEARS, and then you have to perform in front of people who have probably heard your repertoire played by some of the best musicians alive. there are prescreening recordings and other admissions requirements, of course, but for a musician the live audition is an enormous part of the decision. and there is so much that can go wrong in the room which has absolutely nothing to do with how good you are! imagine you're playing piano, and halfway through a passage you get a cramp in your leg. perhaps the lighting is weird and you can't quite see what you need to. somebody coughs at exactly the wrong moment, and for a second your concentration goes somewhere else. the bow hairs on your violin start to come apart…

i also think the comparison with harvard (and other ivy leagues in general) becomes notable when you consider how much privilege affects conventional college admissions. an applicant from a wealthy family may have attended an expensive private school and had years of academic tutoring, and extracurricular achievements generally come from money. a student who has the means to spend an entire summer doing something impressive for their application is in a drastically different position from somebody who has to work. research by raj chetty and his colleagues found that applicants from the wealthiest families enjoyed substantial advantages in admissions to ivy-plus universities, even when compared with applicants who had similar test scores.

but i suppose someone could argue that wealth matters in music too. private lessons are expensive, and a child whose family can afford an instrument and regular instruction has an enormous advantage over one who can't. juilliard, obviously, isn’t some magical institution where money stops mattering. but even after all that preparation, the applicant has to perform! whatever advantages brought you into that room, you're still the one sitting at the piano when somebody asks you to begin! no revisions, no do-overs.. your best on the spot!

i find that people tend to dismiss arts as something less intellectually serious than an academic discipline. classical musicians have to understand extraordinarily complicated compositions, but there are also matters of actually physically performing them. i don't think people always appreciate how much work goes into developing that kind of control.

sometimes i think about how often i revise my own writing, sometimes changing a sentence over and over because the wording isn't quite right……. a musician can have all those opinions about a passage of music, but when it's time to audition, they have to make the decisions while they're playing. and if something goes wrong, they have to keep going! i can't imagine spending so much of my life preparing for something and then having to walk out of the room knowing there wasn't a single thing i could change about what everybody had just heard. go arts, and go juilliard.. as a stem person, i could never do what you do!

06 Nov 2026, 10:00

02 Nov 2026

the fermi paradox and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence??

existence is nuts. i was watching a sean carroll video about the scale of the universe and began thinking about extraterrestrial life. exoplanet surveys suggest that planets are extremely common around stars, and one analysis of kepler observations estimated that approximately half of sun-like stars could host rocky planets capable of supporting liquid water under suitable conditions. the milky way itself also contains something on the order of a hundred billion stars, and the observable universe contains far more galaxies than we could ever hope to examine individually…

it seems nearly impossible to believe that no life exists beyond earth, particularly if we consider the possibility of microbial organisms or life with an entirely unfamiliar biochemistry. of course, we can, unfortunately, not calculate those odds with any real confidence.

i believe that people seem to underestimate the scale of the universe and time when it comes to making contact. life existed here for billions of years before humans arrived; earth is approximately 4.5 billion years old, while the universe is about 13.8 billion years old. our ability to transmit information over interplanetary distances is a recent development. if another civilization had existed a million years before ours, it could conceivably have disappeared. two civilizations could occupy the same galaxy and never exist at the same time…... there could be a civilization forming right now around some distant star unaware that humans have already been transmitting signals into space for roughly a century. even if intelligent life is not particularly rare, the period during which any particular civilization is detectable might be extremely short compared with the age of the galaxy.

even if an intelligent civilization existed nearby, the distances involved would make communication extraordinarily difficult…… proxima centauri, the nearest star to the sun, is approximately 4.24 light-years away. light travels at about 300,000 kilometers per second, which means that even ome message sent from the nearest star system cannot arrive here in less than four years. the andromeda galaxy (our nearest neighbor) is approximately 2.5 million light-years away. when we observe andromeda, we are seeing light that began its journey long before modern humans existed. if some civilization there were looking at the milky way through some magnificent telescope, it would be receiving similarly ancient information about our galaxy. imagine two intelligent species attempting to communicate across that distance. one sends some message and the other receives it 2.5 million years later, assuming the signal remains detectable. a reply would require another 2.5 million years. i suppose this is one of the stranger implications of astronomical observation: distance is also a separation in time. voyager 1 was launched in 1977 and crossed the heliopause into interstellar space in 2012, which is a remarkable achievement. voyager 1, however, travels at roughly seventeen kilometers per second relative to the sun. at that speed, a hypothetical journey to proxima centauri would take more than seventy thousand years.

according to special relativity, an object with mass cannot be accelerated to the speed of light by supplying a finite amount of energy. there are theoretical discussions of wormholes and spacetime geometries that might permit unusual forms of travel, but these are not established engineering possibilities. the mathematical existence of a particular solution does not tell us that the required physical conditions can be produced, much less maintained around a spacecraft carrying actual people (unless you read physicists’ hyperspace theories! ha)

i do wonder how much this could change with technological development. we have spent only a relatively short period of human history building machines capable of leaving earth, and our computational abilities have advanced rapidly enough that the next few decades are difficult to predict. artificial intelligence could become extraordinarily useful in the development of propulsion systems or in designing autonomous probes that operate for years without instructions from earth, but extraordinarily capable artificial intelligence would not make the energy requirements of interstellar travel disappear. an autonomous probe does not need a human crew or the systems required to keep that crew alive, and designs involving beamed propulsion or light sails offer possibilities very different from conventional chemical rockets.

which brings me to the fermi paradox! given the age of the universe, it seems possible that other civilizations could have developed technology millions of years before we did. if some of them became capable of interstellar travel, why haven't we found any convincing evidence of their existence? it is a reasonable question, although the strength of the paradox depends on assumptions about how frequently technological civilizations emerge and whether they would have any interest in expanding across the galaxy.

perhaps interstellar travel is simply too difficult to be worth undertaking….. perhaps civilizations tend to disappear before reaching the point at which they could accomplish it. the idea of a great filter suggests that one or more stages between the formation of a potentially habitable planet and the development of a long-lived technological civilization may be exceptionally improbable. we do not know where such a difficulty would lie, assuming it exists at all, and the implications are rather different depending on whether the hardest step is behind us or still ahead.

i have also wondered whether we are making unreasonable assumptions about what an advanced civilization would want. we tend to imagine technological progress culminating in expansion, partly because human history provides so many examples of people attempting to occupy places previously inaccessible to them. another species might regard a journey lasting thousands of years as a spectacular waste of resources. its technology might produce little that we could recognize or detect from another star system. or it might be interested in exploration without being interested in us.

and it is worth remembering how little of the potential search space we have actually examined. projects devoted to the search for extraterrestrial intelligence have examined particular regions of the sky and certain types of potential signals, but the possibilities are much broader than the observations completed so far. our own ordinary radio transmissions would be extremely difficult for a civilization with equipment comparable to ours to detect from distant star systems. if another planet had been broadcasting for a century, we might simply be too far away to know.

astronomers are also looking for possible biosignatures in exoplanet atmospheres, which would allow us to investigate biological activity without requiring a civilization to send us a deliberate message. atmospheric oxygen, for example, can be associated with biological processes, although it can also be produced abiotically, so identifying a particular molecule would not necessarily amount to discovering life. the interpretation would depend on the surrounding atmospheric chemistry and the properties of the planet itself. i wonder what it would feel like to see convincing evidence that another world supports life, knowing that its inhabitants might remain permanently inaccessible to us.

we can photograph galaxies millions of light-years from earth, yet we cannot say whether there is a single living organism anywhere outside our own planet. perhaps the universe is absolutely crowded with life, each civilization watching its own tiny portion of the sky and wondering where everybody is. very strange and beautiful.

02 Nov 2026, 19:58

31 Oct 2026

even if you regret the courageous choice you will respect it

today i am thinking of friedrich nietzsche, who pursued lou salomé and proposed marriage to her three times. she rejected him three times.

i am also thinking of albert einstein, who, after revolutionizing physics, spent more than thirty years pursuing a unified field theory; he wanted to prove that all forces and matter intertwine and that they are not separate entities, but different shapes. in 1931, he described his unsuccessful attempts as a “graveyard of dead hopes.”

and i am thinking of henry david thoreau, who wrote his first book and it sold so poorly that his publisher returned 706 unsold copies to him. thoreau later joked that he owned a grand library primarily containing books he had written himself.

and i am thinking of vincent van gogh, who was not famous during his lifetime and lived in poverty, who either died at his own hand or at the hand of a teenager he chose not to implicate.

to live is to live unapologetically. there will be moments when our risks, our dreams are not fruitful. there, also, will be people who do not like you for living loudly. live loudly anyways. you might get called performative for being “out there” about your interests. who cares; live for yourself. engage in the pleasures you might eventually regret, as the greater regret will come from never trying at all.

Excerpt from It’s Kind of a Funny Story by Ned Vizzini, image 1
Excerpt from It’s Kind of a Funny Story by Ned Vizzini, image 2
– it’s kind of a funny story by ned vizzini

31 Oct 2026, 11:41

26 Oct 2026

do gravitons exist? and what if einstein was only MOSTLY right about gravity?

gravitons are hypothetical particles that arise from a quantum description of gravity. physicists can predict their properties and construct theories around them, although no individual graviton has ever been detected. their proposed existence raises a fundamental question: how can gravity be understood as both the geometry of spacetime and a quantum interaction?

i. the graviton, allegedly

general relativity describes gravity as the curvature of spacetime. matter and energy influence its geometry, and that geometry determines how matter moves. then, quantum field theory gives us a different language to work with. electromagnetic radiation consists of photons, and the other fundamental interactions are similarly described using quantum fields and their particles. naturally, we should wonder whether gravity can be understood this way too.

if we take small disturbances in the spacetime metric and quantize them, the corresponding particle is the graviton, a massless spin-2 boson. in the usual description derived from general relativity, it has two independent polarizations. i am trying to avoid jargon and would like this to be accessible to the average reader, so this essentially means that if gravity follows the rules of quantum mechanics, tiny ripples in spacetime would be made up of individual particles called gravitons, much like light is made up of photons. these particles would have no rest mass, and rather than literally spinning, their “spin-2” property describes how they behave under rotation. the two polarizations simply mean that gravitational waves can stretch and squeeze space in two distinct patterns as they travel. there is also an important distinction here, which is that: general relativity is a classical theory. it predicts gravitational waves, but does not, by itself, experimentally establish the existence of gravitons.

in 2015, LIGO detected gravitational waves for the first time. this was an enormous confirmation of einstein's predictions, but it was not a detection of an individual graviton. in an interview with janna levin, theoretical physicist claudia de rham explains that a classical gravitational wave can be understood, in quantum language, as an immense collection of gravitons. observing the collective wave is not the same thing as resolving one quantum. (side note - i was particularly interested in investigating claudia de rham after listening to her mindscape episode with sean carroll! beautifully worded and an interesting listen). we therefore occupy a rather peculiar position: we have observed the classical phenomenon that would correspond to gravitons, but not the quantum particles themselves, and perhaps the more interesting question is whether these hypothetical particles must have exactly the properties we have assigned to them.

ii. claudia de rham and the possibility of massive gravity

claudia de rham is a theoretical physicist whose research explores modifications to general relativity, especially working under a theory called massive gravity. 

in the conventional quantum-field description of einstein's gravity, the graviton is massless. the consequence is that gravity is a long-range interaction, extending across arbitrarily large distances even as its strength diminishes. but what if the graviton had a tiny mass?

a massive particle obeys the energy-momentum relation,

E² = p²c² + m²c⁴

and consequently cannot travel at exactly the speed of light. for a sufficiently light graviton, gravitational waves would still travel extraordinarily close to that speed, though their propagation (by propagation i mean how gravitational waves travel through spacetime, specifically their speed and whether different frequencies travel at different speeds…) could depend upon frequency. the graviton's mass would also introduce a characteristic distance scale at which gravitational behavior could begin departing from general relativity. this might initially sound like a very small modification. it is NOT.

a massless spin-2 particle in four-dimensional spacetime has two physical polarizations. a massive one has five. by introducing a mass, we introduce three additional ways for the gravitational field to behave.

historically, attempts to construct an interacting theory of massive gravity encountered serious theoretical problems, particularly an instability known as the boulware-deser ghost. a ghost, in this context, is an unphysical degree of freedom whose energy structure makes a theory unstable. in 2011, though, de rham, gregory gabadadze, and andrew tolley developed the nonlinear theory now called dRGT massive gravity, which eliminates this unwanted ghost while retaining the five degrees of freedom of a massive spin-2 field. this was important because it demonstrated that the mathematical obstacles to a consistent massive graviton were not as absolute as physicists had previously assumed. it also did not establish that the graviton actually has mass; it established that we could construct a much more credible theory in which it does.

iii. why modify general relativity in the first place?

one of the greatest unresolved problems in cosmology is the accelerating expansion of the universe. within general relativity, this expansion can be explained by a cosmological constant, usually represented by Λ. the difficulty is that the vacuum energy suggested by quantum field theory does not naturally agree with the extraordinarily small value required by our observations. this discrepancy is the cosmological constant problem.

de rham asks whether we have been approaching the problem from the wrong direction. instead of introducing an additional mysterious component into the universe, perhaps we ought to reconsider how gravity responds to the energy that is already present. in her 2020 interview with quanta, she describes this distinction using the two sides of einstein's equations. we can modify the contents of the universe, represented by the stress-energy tensor, or we can investigate the gravitational description itself. massive gravity belongs to the latter approach. if gravity behaves differently across cosmological distances, it is possible that our interpretation of the universe's accelerated expansion would change too. modifications to gravity might permit vacuum energy to affect spacetime differently from how it does in conventional general relativity.

there is, however, a problem: gravity works incredibly well exactly as einstein described it on the scales we have tested. the planets orbit properly. light bends around massive objects by the expected amount. gravitational waves arrive with properties remarkably consistent with general relativity. a modified theory therefore has to explain why we have not already noticed its modifications. one possible answer, though, is the vainshtein mechanism, through which nonlinear gravitational interactions suppress the effects of additional degrees of freedom near massive objects. the theory can consequently resemble general relativity in familiar environments while permitting different behavior on much larger scales.

but none of this means massive gravity has solved dark energy. cosmologically viable solutions remain difficult to construct, and our observations have not established a departure from general relativity. de rham discusses these limitations, alongside the theory's developments, in her 2026 paper massive gravity @ 15.

iv. how would we know?

this returns us to the existence of gravitons!!!

we cannot currently point to a single detected graviton and announce that gravity has been quantized. but we can test some of the consequences of theories in which gravitons have different properties. gravitational waves are useful here: if gravitons have mass, gravitational waves can exhibit dispersion: different frequencies would propagate at slightly different speeds. a wave traveling across an enormous cosmological distance might accumulate a measurable difference in its arrival time or waveform.

so far, observations have placed increasingly stringent constraints on such effects, without establishing that the graviton has a nonzero mass.

and even if massive gravity were supported by observations, we would not automatically possess a complete quantum theory of gravity. de rham's work principally concerns a low-energy modification of gravity; the problems encountered when quantizing gravity at very high energies remain distinct. 

i suppose the question is not only whether gravitons exist, but whether they behave as einstein’s theory leads us to expect—or reveal something his description of gravity leaves out.

26 Oct 2026, 15:04

21 Oct 2026

blog

hello, miscellanea! I LOVE YOU MISCELLANEUM.NET. i have had a crazy few days, and i think i have lost my mind. i have been listening to company calls by death cab for cutie on repeat. this is the best song ever. if anyone ever reads this post they have to listen to this song while reading it. if you don’t i am BANNING YOUR IP ADDRESS FROM MY WEBSITE. THAT;S THE RULE!!!! LISTEN TO THE SONG.. or you are BANNNEEDDDD!
(unless you’re a person who is bad at reading and listening to music at the same time. in that case, you have to listen to that song either before or after reading this post.)

sometimes i meet people who i feel like i have invented, and i become obsessed with them. in elementary school when i spent way too much time alone (Only Child) i would invent all of these elaborate stories, sometimes loosely inspired by video games or whatever media i had consumed at the time, sometimes just whatever spawned from my brain. i would pick “favorite names” and exclusively go by them in my writings and games i would play…. for a while i would write my name as xion because i loved xion from kingdom hearts and just thought she had a cool name. then on the rare occasions i made friends (not to self-pity; i don’t care that i was bad at making friends. i was so weird), we would go to The Tree at recess (The Tree was a huge tree shaped kind of like a hand that was perfect for sitting and laying down in. it was such a popular spot that we would have to run as fast as we could as soon as we got outside to get to it and be the first people at the tree and claim it for the recess. it rocked), and i remember creating this elaborate vampire romance story that i would tell people and it would continue every recess. i made it up as i went. my friend krystal was primarily my only listener.. we would go to the tree and she’d be like You have to tell me what happens next in the vampire story. and i’d make things up. this story lasted like a month. it was so awesome.

then i got to middleschool and started playing the sims, and i was given almost unlimited tools to PLAY GOD. i would create the PERFECT CHARACTERS for my perfect little story. this has shaped me into a weird person probably…,. on the rare occasion i meet someone who resembles something i feel as though i would invent, kind of like a character from the sims, i become obsessive about them.

this is a revelation i had recently for some reason even though this is a habit i engage in a lot. i went to the hospital the other day, and my psychiatrist was perfect. her hair was down to her waist and she reminded me of a bug. her eyes were huge and she was probably in her mid to late 20s, but her voice sounded really really young. her voice somewhat sounded like the babysitter from the incredibles. i pay attention to people’s voices a lot.. i think it is really important factor in how we perceive people. i was asleep when she came over to my bed to talk to me, and i looked up at her while i was laying down and it was like there was an angel hovering over me. we talked for a long time and she was so incredibly smart. she spoke quickly and was good at communicating, which was noticeable because she would draw these connections to ask really relevant questions and tell me really interesting input she had. i told her that i was kind of a person who is quietly distressed, so people sometimes don’t take me seriously. she told me that she thought the mental health system was a little bit corrupt because people aren’t often taken seriously unless they cause scenes, but people who cause scenes are then labelled as crazy and not taken seriously in a different way. i’ve felt this way for a long time actually, and it was really cool to speak to someone who is intertwined in assisting mental health and also acknowledges how corrupt it sometimes is. she was incredibly observant too. i got distracted at one point during our conversation, and she paused and examined me for a second, like she was trying to read my face and figure out what i was thinking about. she would explain things to me in detail and then apologize for “talking at me for so long.” i would tell her not to apologize because her explanations were incredibly detailed and helpful and i liked hearing her insight. i rarely meet people like her, and she felt like a figment of my imagination. i am trying to think about her objectively as i write this, and i hope none of my bias results in me inaccurately portraying my interaction with her.

she feels a perfect person i would invent, so i can’t stop thinking about her. this is obviously a highly inappropriate thought to have about someone you have a professional relationship with, but beyond her professional input, she gave me some of her personal insights as well; she was incredibly intelligent and thoughtful, and i believe she will lead an interesting life. i’m unsure if this sentence is clear, but i do not want to delete it. to elaborate in a different way, our conversation did not just include the shallowness that professional interactions have (i believe that when people try to be professional, they attempt to be so objective that they sometimes are hesitant to express their own input or opinions; they speak strictly scientifically); she had personal insights and opinions that gave her a unique perspective of the world. i can’t remember her name, and when i got home, i had the bad idea to go through my discharge papers to try to find her name and investigate her. this is obviously crazy and violating her privacy so i did not do this. i also just do not really want to expand my thoughts on her and turn her into a character. if i made any assumptions about her beyond this interaction (which i suspect i might if i decided to research her further), i would no longer be looking at her, i would be looking at my delusion of her. my assumptions turn people into characters. i like her for what she is, and i like that simple interaction, and i don’t need more. i will just remember her, but i will admit that it is sad to meet a very special person and have them leave your life suddenly. i really liked how she looked at the world.

i sound crazy and obsessive. my terrible desire to investigate her made me feel guilty, and i realized that i just tend to become infatuated with people who feel like they come from my brain. i will very rarely meet someone, and it will feel as though i am talking to myself, like my internal monologue is having a conversation. and sometimes people will be beautiful, present themselves in a way where i felt as though i have dreamt them. i thought she was beautiful, and i thought my interaction with her was beautiful, and i do not know if i am doing justice to my interaction with her here.

she is a sim i would make. ha.

i don’t know what to do with the rest of my day or time. i’m looking out my window right now, and it looks like it might rain. i will feel relieved if it does. i love it when it rains. i need to contact my professors about how i have been awol recently, but i’ve sent out so many emails recently and rarely hear back from anyone. oh well. i’ll shower and eat, maybe go through my gradescope. i guess i just have to keep doing assignments and wait for people to get back to me. i hate when i am trying to take the steps to take care of myself, and it eventually gets out of my control. oh well.

until next time, miscellanea…… love you forever, my rainbow blog
yours truly, helena

21 Oct 2026, 16:59

20 Oct 2026

PALINGENESIS; OR, FIVE THINGS TO PONDER WHILE DYING

STEP 1: Light the candles and beg.

It will be better this time; it will be better this time.

The air in my apartment is stale, and I can hear the incessant, insectile buzz of my decrepit fluorescent light. My blood is rushing in hot now under my skin. I must ignore their rallies outside, their deafening ululations echoing. They are spectacular and grisly, hankering for blood. They have erected a wooden likeness of me with my alien-like features, and they are ready to destroy it. I am deprived of touch, and I have not left my room in two days. My eyes burn, bloodshot and tired. I do not know if I have apologized to anyone in the crowd, nor do I know if they are actually there. I do not know if the fires are real. Perhaps it is kicking in.

There are six candles lined up, and he had guaranteed they would be sufficient for the duration of the ceremony. I have been begging since the candles were lit, although I cannot establish whether I am asking to be forgiven, to be made again, or to be relieved of the responsibility of existing in my present condition. I suspect these are entirely different requests, but I have begun addressing them in the same, vague manner. Please let this work. He also provided me with the peculiar arylcyclohexylamine synthesized by a dying man in Prague who preached the impermanence of personal identity and the indestructibility of the soul. The man had apparently hoped to isolate consciousness from the great accumulation of memories and bodily sensations through which it ordinarily recognized itself, though his experiments had the rather inconvenient consequence of resurrecting the faces of people from his subjects’ past. He insisted these apparitions were merely the final disturbances of a disintegrating identity. There is also the laughing gas, of course, which I have not yet touched. He said it might make it easier to confront my past and decide what I was willing to leave behind, and it would make it easier to encounter It.

The instructions are handwritten on five pieces of yellow paper, promising a second creation, a complete restoration of the organism to a condition preceding its moral deterioration, “palingenesis.” The author claims to have witnessed its successful completion on five occasions – five separate rebirths. He speaks of the flesh becoming friable, separating from the body in great, translucent sheets, until the organism, having undergone an extraordinary metamorphosis, begins to regenerate. New skin, new organs, a new brain – an entirely new identity. I am desperate for another life; I want to be absolved of this life, as I can no longer carry the burden of guilt and responsibility.

STEP 2: Fill the goblet with the amount of blood that is equal to your suffering.

I do not fill the cup all the way. I do not know how desperate I am; hypothetically, I should fill the goblet all the way, but blood makes me nauseous, and the blade hurts. Perhaps I am not the right person to perform this ritual. I was told, “Desperation, it will only work if you’re desperate. It will only work if you give it everything.” I tried to stab myself in the stomach, and I was brave enough to press hard but not brave enough to accelerate. If I really wanted to stab myself, I would have moved hard and fast. I feel like I am not strong enough. I really hope this works, but I am not hoping enough.

Outside, the protestors have acquired a jukebox from a diner on the corner. Someone has connected it to an extension cord running through the ground-floor window, and it is playing a mellifluous song I recognize from my childhood. Their dances to this are convulsive, liturgical. I see my dead neighbor in the crowd sitting comfortably on a folding chair eating something out of a paper bag. I was warned of seeing people who could no longer be encountered under ordinary circumstances. He had called this a collapse of certain perceptual boundaries, a consequence of the brain becoming uncertain about which of its representations correspond to objects in the external world. I really hope this works. I close the curtains.

STEP 3: Lie on your back and do not stop inhaling.

I put the mask on, and by now, my body has become a vile enclosure to inhabit, sweat dripping down my forehead. Perhaps forgiveness is logarithmic. Lying on my back, I hope everyone forgives me. Please forgive me. Please forgive me. I know that I am a liar, and some part of me hopes this knowledge will follow me to my grave, although I have also spent the entire night begging to be relieved of it. I keep promising myself that I will repair everything quickly, while there are still people willing to listen, but my fear is wasting time. I am running out of time. I am capitulating. I am obliged to exhale, although the instructions make no provision for it. Inhale.

The walls are shrinking, expanding, shrinking, and the carpet is producing geometric proliferations, hexagons within hexagons, each containing another room identical to mine. Inhale.

Somewhere in the apartment, an electrical appliance is humming, a choir composed entirely of insects. Inhale.

The instructions say that It will become visible during this stage, “It,” being understood provisionally as a designation for whichever primordial intelligence or generative principle is responsible for the existence of everything. There is no mention of heaven, judgment, sins, or eternal punishment. I try to imagine the original creator. Not a man, nor an enormous face suspended among clouds, but the antecedent of every conceivable object, a luminous and undifferentiated source from which all emerged. I wonder whether the creation was deliberate. Inhale.

The room brightens. I open my eyes, although I cannot remember closing them.

STEP 4: Enumerate the things you are prepared to surrender.

The fourth instruction concerns the eradication of the former self, and the author is emphatic about the necessity of a complete severance, explaining that partial regeneration produces a grotesque hybrid of old and new characteristics, comparable to an animal which has begun metamorphosis but cannot complete it.

I begin writing down the obvious things I wish to leave behind, the time-consuming vices, the lies, the small habits of manipulation. The less readily admitted deficiencies take longer to enumerate: the satisfaction I occasionally derive from desire, the lies I tell myself to believe I am innocent. The lack of willingness. I should have been braver. To do this, I have to be brave.

Outside, the rally has fallen silent, and I peek through my curtains and gaze into the mixed expressions in the crowd. Some people will be pleased by my departure, others uncertain. I do not know if anyone will miss me. I stare into the eyes of an ex-lover, the eyes of my younger cousin whom I had betrayed, the eyes of my mother. There was a time when people seemed to have considerably less to say about the injuries they inflicted upon one another, but now everyone speaks so fluently of trauma, manipulation, and the various indignities of human attachment. Everyone is evolving into extremely educated people; there is no room for error here. Beyond the guilt I feel as my eyes wander into this crowd, I feel love, sorrow, and I begin to contemplate the existence of a soul. If there exists something in me that persists independently of my memories, my habits, and the accumulated consequences of my behavior, would it retain any capacity to love them? I have been instructed to surrender my former self, but I cannot establish whether that also requires completely surrendering everyone who has ever constituted a part of it. How do I surrender this? I close the curtains.

I take another sheet of paper and begin a second list; on this one, I write their names. Everyone I can remember. I begin with those I know I have hurt, then add the names of people whose suffering I, in retrospect, may have been too preoccupied to recognize.

Everything I can think of. Everything I can think of. The jukebox stops outside. I will miss that song if I am capable of longing, capable of missing, after this.

STEP 5: Present yourself before It.

The candles are now extinguished, but the apartment is glowing with the most blazing light I have ever seen. At first, I naturally attribute this to the approaching morning, though the windows remain covered and the light’s origin is impossible to determine. My hands become illuminated by some internal source, their veins forming a delicate blue arborization from beneath the skin.

There is a sensation of extraordinary proximity, as though something immense has entered the room without occupying any measurable space. I have the impression that I am being examined, not with hostility or affection, but with the exhaustive attention one might give to an unfamiliar specimen, and for a moment I feel almost relieved to be regarded without any of the usual human qualifications.

Outside, the demonstrators are beginning another procession. The jukebox has started again, though it is distorted this time. The melody is not distinguishable. I hear the scrape of their shoes against the pavement, and beneath the distorted melody, somebody is calling something that might be my name. I cannot distinguish one voice from another.

I examine the two lists: one containing everything I have come to hate about myself, the second containing the names of everyone I have hurt. Everything. I could draw a line from nearly every confession to a name. I had considered folding my second list of names and putting it in my pocket, keeping it to myself rather than presenting it to It, though I cannot understand what would become of those names if I succeeded in relinquishing everything written on the first. I had wanted to be remade into somebody who had never done wrong, but I am beginning to wonder whether such a person would retain any knowledge of what there was to make right. Perhaps this is why I struggle to set fire to everything I have been, everything I have seen. Even worse, I cannot address my wrongs and would rather have my cake and eat it too; I so wish that everyone could forgive me without an apology; I cannot admit my wrongdoings. I have come to regard this reluctance as cowardice, and it has gotten to the point where I am no longer certain whether I am frightened of relinquishing my existence or of continuing to occupy it. I must do something, whether that is fixing the now or undergoing palingenesis.

It will be better this time. I need to get better. I need to be determined, brave. Whichever choice I make.

I need to do something.

I present the goblet and both of the papers before It. For a moment, the room shines so brightly that the two lists become indistinguishable from the surface beneath them, and I can no longer distinguish my hands from the surrounding air. I have the extraordinary impression of being returned to a condition preceding my own existence, to the first great, devastating luminosity from which all subsequent distinctions arose, and I wonder whether It is receiving me or preparing to send me back.

I try to inhale. The crowd has stopped shouting. Something is happening to my body, although I cannot determine whether I am becoming more acutely aware of it or losing my connection to it altogether. The light is spectacular, intolerably beautiful, and I find myself thinking of every ordinary morning I have ever squandered wishing I were somebody else.

There is a knock at the door. I cannot see the door anymore, but I hear the knock again, followed by a voice asking whether I am there.

I believe that I recognize the voice.

I want to tell them that I am having second thoughts about forgetting everything. I want to tell them that I am not asking to have it erased, that I am prepared to carry it with me, that perhaps an entire life need not be discarded merely because some portion of it has become unbearable, but I cannot bring myself to speak the words. I want the person on the other side of the door to come inside, although I cannot decide whether I am asking them to bring me back into the world or merely to witness my departure from it.

I am still torn between a fear of rebirth and a fear of continuity.

The light intensifies.

Somebody is calling what I believe is my name again, but I am not sure whether I am capable of making a sound.

20 Oct 2026, 00:55

07 Oct 2026

MONOCHROMACY: LIFE IS BORING

i have been noticing that everything is becoming monochromatic, both literally and in the metaphorical sense…..

monochromacy is technically already a word, although i am using it somewhat irresponsibly here. i keep noticing how grey everything is becoming, and i don't think it's limited to objects or architecture. websites are beginning to look alike, too, and sometimes i wonder whether people are becoming less willing to be strange themselves. that last observation is harder to establish, admittedly. i have mostly been developing this theory by being annoyed on the internet.

the literal color part is not entirely in my head! the science museum group digital lab analyzed photographs of 7,083 objects in its collection and found that grey increased substantially over time while browns and yellows declined. changes in manufacturing materials presumably explain some of this, particularly the replacement of wood with plastic and metal. i was delighted to discover that somebody had actually investigated it.

cars are grey, and every newly renovated apartment seems to require white walls and grey fake-wood floors, as though there is a municipal ordinance against enjoying your kitchen! logos have had their little illustrations beaten out of them until only a company name in a geometric sans serif remains….

even places that advertise their individuality tend to look suspiciously alike. exposed brick everywhere, perhaps one neon sign if somebody is feeling particularly dangerous! (has anyone seen that millennial burger joint meme… google it if you don’t know what i’m talking about)

older colorful McDonald’s building compared with a newer muted McDonald’s building
source: architexthub on instagram

this might be why i keep making this website more obnoxious……… OH YEAH HELLLOOOO NEWWW UPDATE! RAINBOW LETTERS AND PIXEL ANIMALS IN THE MARGINSSSS. EVEN MORE FUN UPDATES TO COME…. JUST WAIT EVERYONNNE!!! !!!!!!

i recently read adam mastroianni’s essay on substack about what he calls the “decline of deviance,” which gave me a way of connecting several things i had been noticing separately and heavily inspired this essay. Heyyyg thank you adam!!!!! he discusses how certain forms of risky behavior have declined over the past several decades, particularly among teenagers. americans also move away from home less often (sad!). meanwhile, popular culture has become increasingly concentrated around familiar franchises, and even scientific writing appears to have become more standardized.

“deviance” is a useful word because it includes things with completely different moral consequences. murder qualifies as deviance, but so does spending four years teaching yourself to construct harpsichords despite having no reasonable market for harpsichords. i would quite like to inhabit a society with fewer murders and more unsolicited harpsichords.

movies are perhaps the example that annoys me most because i actually like movies. i know “Film” “People” will tell me that cinema peaked in 1947 and that what i really need to do is watch a restored four-hour czechoslovakian film in which a widow stares through a window for eighteen uninterrupted minutes, and sometimes (but very rarely) they are right.

there are beautiful films from the first half of the twentieth century, along with a myriad which i find boring, and my own movie sweet spot is approximately 1980–2019. this is such an enormous span of time that a person could argue it barely constitutes an opinion. i suppose what i miss is the possibility of an expensive, commercially successful movie being genuinely unusual without having to introduce itself through characters everybody already knows. i would greatly appreciate newer media with a plot that takes a little extra effort to explain.

mastroianni looked at the twenty highest-grossing movies going back to 1977 and classified them according to whether they belonged to an existing cinematic “multiplicity,” meaning an established franchise or related property. before 2000, about a quarter belonged to those categories; since 2010, more than half have every year, with the share often reaching around three-quarters under a broader definition. i occasionally enjoy a good sequel, but i don't particularly want to spend the rest of my life watching the same fictional universes expand.

this also extends to music! i recently watched carl e. martin’s brilliant video, The Gen Alpha Melody, in which he follows a particular melodic shape through an enormous number of songs. an interesting watch which i will link at the end of this post, if anyone is interested.

when writing this, i also found research by madeline hamilton and marcus pearce that offers a more specific basis for comparison. their analysis of 1,131 melodic transcriptions from top billboard songs between 1950 and 2023 identified major shifts around 1975 and 2000. they found decreasing pitch and rhythmic complexity alongside increasing note density, with post-2000 melodies tending toward smaller intervals. the researchers also discuss how complexity might have moved into production rather than simply disappeared. i think that's worth considering, given how much a musician can now do with sound.

websites tend to bother me in a more personal way, since wanting some control over mine is partly why i built this instead of making a substack or tumblr. i miss how much you could do to a page on platforms people actually used. myspace and old youtube pages could look catastrophically different from one another (if anyone actually reads this, please google what old youtube pages looked like!!!!). people changed cursors and chose backgrounds against which reading became a physical ordeal. some of these pages were genuinely terrible to use, but i would nevertheless like a little more room to make those decisions myself. i like when a page has personality and it's pretty obvious that a human made it.

mastroianni describes web aesthetics changing enormously through the 1990s and 2000s before settling into a comparatively stable repertoire of sleek layouts. i understand why practical websites would favor standardized navigation, particularly if somebody is just trying to buy a train ticket. i don't really understand why a personal website should be held to similar standards.

the extension from aesthetics to human behavior is more complicated. i am glad that many destructive behaviors have declined, particularly those that put other people in danger. i don't think there's anything charming about addiction simply because somebody might eventually write an interesting memoir about it.

however, i find it interesting how ordinary life now seems to be discussed in the language of maintenance. people monitor their sleep and track their food as though they are conducting a very long experiment on themselves. there are perfectly good reasons to care about your health, obviously. i would like my knees to work. i enjoy antibiotics.

but sometimes being a person sounds like the custodianship of an expensive object whose eventual owner will be very disappointed if you damage it. mastroianni suggests that a safer, wealthier life gives people more to lose, which could partly explain why they become more cautious. he connects this to what life-history researchers call a “slow” strategy, involving greater investment in the future.

i can see the appeal of that explanation without knowing how much it accounts for. if you expect to live until ninety, you have good reasons to consider what your life might look like at eighty. i just think it's funny how easily that future person becomes an authority over everything you do now, despite being conveniently unavailable to tell you whether they would have preferred that you occasionally enjoyed yourself.

there are perfectly practical reasons for choosing neutral apartments or familiar movies. i don't think the people making these decisions are necessarily opposed to originality, and an unusual choice can be expensive if it goes wrong. but i cannot understand the enthusiasm for decorating an entire home around the preferences of some hypothetical future purchaser. imagine disliking your own living room for ten years because somebody you have never met might eventually want to buy it.

perhaps they would have liked a green wall! perhaps they, too, are sitting somewhere grey, wondering who keeps asking for this!

i also recognize that people have different amounts of freedom to make unusual decisions. it's much easier to experiment when the consequences of failure aren't particularly serious, and an uncertain career is a different proposition when somebody else can pay your rent. i don't want to pretend that having fewer options is a failure of imagination.

still, i believe more people should engage in deviance, including me, within the enormous territory of things that might be embarrassing or impractical without ruining anybody's life. people already seem to enjoy the results. they photograph colorful houses and become attached to strange little stores that have somehow survived for decades. i particularly love bookstores whose owners have accumulated so many objects that the original purpose of the building is becoming difficult to determine.

there's a lot of affection for things that somebody spent an unreasonable amount of time making, even among people who would never give themselves permission to do something similar.

i think smaller decisions are where this becomes especially irritating. wearing something somebody might laugh at shouldn't require much justification. neither should becoming interested in a subject you will never be able to put on a résumé. spending six months on something peculiar might end with an object nobody wants, but i have difficulty accepting that this automatically makes the six months a mistake.

i keep coming back to the possibility that a person can become so good at keeping their options open that they never quite choose anything. you can spend years making decisions according to what you might someday want, or what some future employer might think, without ever doing anything particularly outrageous. i understand why people worry about those things. i just don't want to reach old age with an immaculate record of having been reasonable about everything.

some things should take too long.

Annd some hobbies should produce absolutely nothing marketable.

AAAANNNNNNDDDDD SOMEBODY Sshould write the Weird Little Book that nobody asked for.

HEY! more people should occasionally make decisions whose entire defense consists of Because-I-Wanted-To.

i want the advantages of modern safety and enough latitude to do something interesting with the years it gives me. go to the doctor! and then.. DO SOMETHING UNNECESSARY!!!!!!!!!!! decorate something in a way that makes it harder to sell.

i would like to stop feeling that every enthusiasm needs a second, more respectable purpose before i can take it seriously.. i want more color!

sources / things i was reading

the decline of deviance — adam mastroianni

the main source for the broader connection between declining behavioral deviance and cultural, aesthetic, and institutional homogenization.

pop culture has become an oligopoly — adam mastroianni

useful for the franchise / sequel data and concentration of popular culture.

trajectories and revolutions in popular melody based on u.s. charts from 1950 to 2023 — madeline hamilton and marcus pearce

for the analysis of melodic complexity, pitch range, rhythm, and note density over time.

the gen alpha melody — carl e. martin

colour & shape — science museum group digital lab

for the analysis of 7,083 collection objects and the long-term rise in grey.

07 Oct 2026, 18:37

06 Oct 2026

things i LOVE!!!!!!!!!

06 Oct 2026, 16:00

01 Oct 2026

the existence of a soul

this post is going to intertwine with something i had urgently written in my notebook some months back that i only posted one page of. thus, i will post the full writings here, organizing and elucidating my thoughts further and maybe actually properly explaining them this time around.

handwritten notebook page about love and the soul handwritten notebook page continuing the argument about attachment and love handwritten notebook page about personal continuity and the soul

i have always been hesitant to accept the existence of a soul given my empiricism toward metaphysics. i tend to distrust metaphysical claims because they are not readily falsifiable, and therefore do not provide much empirical warrant for belief. however, this does not make them false. the same limitation that prevents me from verifying a metaphysical claim also prevents me from treating its absence of verification as a disproof. thus, i have generally remained agnostic. as i have lived longer, though, and accumulated more experiences, i have begun to take the possibility of a soul more seriously.

in my notebook, i had primarily said that this was due to unconditional love. people can continue loving each other even when the form of that love has changed so drastically that it scarcely resembles the original relationship anymore. i think people are at least somewhat aware of this, which is part of why ex-lovers can remain intimidating long after a relationship is over.

there is an obvious explanation for this which requires nothing metaphysical. if somebody was attracted to another person before, who is to say that the attraction could not return? whatever produced that attraction may not have disappeared simply because the relationship ended. an ex from a brief relationship who no longer seems especially desirable might therefore feel relatively unthreatening, but the same person becomes considerably more intimidating if the relationship lasted five years. even if the ex seems comparatively unremarkable from the outside, five years of intimacy is difficult to dismiss. why should duration alter the threat so substantially if what matters is merely attraction?

this is where longevity becomes interesting to me, not because time itself proves the existence of a soul, but because of what can happen to people during that time. after five years, another person has not simply learned facts about you. they have known earlier versions of you and remained present while those versions became later ones. somebody arriving afterward can know the person you are now extremely well, but they cannot retroactively occupy the years in which you were becoming them.

this connects to something else i had written in my notebook that i had almost forgotten about: people can change enormously and still feel like themselves. nearly everything by which i would describe myself has altered over time, and yet when i envision myself as a small child, i still feel like me. if my childhood self and my present self were placed beside one another, there might be remarkably little apparent overlap between them, and nevertheless i do not experience my life as though one person ended and another began. what is this core that seems to defy the obvious logic of change? what persists when so much else can be altered?

this is closer to what i mean when i use the word soul. perhaps a soul is not another quality a person possesses alongside everything else, because the qualities by which we recognize somebody can change. perhaps it is whatever permits all of these altered versions of a person to remain continuous with one another. if that is the case, then loving somebody may sometimes mean becoming attached not merely to what they are like at one moment, but to the person who persists through those alterations.

this is where the knot makes sense to me. two people do not simply encounter one another and remain unchanged beside each other; as their lives continue, each becomes entangled with versions of the other that no longer quite exist. the lines become tighter over time because each person has participated in the other's continuity. ending the relationship may loosen the knot, but it cannot return either line to precisely what it was before.

drawing of two lines becoming increasingly intertwined like a knot over time

as i was first writing this in my notebook, though, romantic love still felt as if it fell short as an argument for the existence of a soul. romance already gives us ordinary reasons for attachment to persist, which makes it difficult to determine what, if anything, remains for a metaphysical explanation to account for. thus, i started focusing on friendships and familial love, where attraction cannot do nearly as much explanatory work.

i talked about my childhood best friend, who has evolved into a person i would not like if i met her randomly now. i have a strong distaste toward her morals, i do not trust her, and i do not particularly enjoy speaking to her. she repeatedly betrayed me when i was vulnerable to her, which is the briefest explanation for why i eventually stopped speaking to her. logically, almost every present reason for loving her has deteriorated, and nevertheless i love her. i cannot help it.

we grew up together. she slept in my bed. we understood things about one another that mattered enormously to us, and although we have both changed, a piece of us is still that old version of ourselves. i can dislike the person she has become while still loving somebody who is not exactly gone, because the child i knew did not disappear and get replaced by another person. she became this person.

i still want good things to happen to her. when i learn that somebody is treating her badly, some old loyalty reappears despite there being almost no present relationship left to defend. why? betrayal was sufficient to make me stop trusting her, and in some respects even to hate her, but apparently hatred and love are not mutually exhaustive. something persists beneath both of them.

if love attached only to a person's present qualities, then sufficiently altering those qualities should eventually destroy the object of the love. sometimes it does, but sometimes it does not. there are people whom we cease to admire or even like and yet continue loving in some residual way. what, exactly, is that love attached to?

unconditional love was the main thing i wrote about in my notebook, but there is another feeling that makes me wonder about the same thing: the spark. sometimes people meet somebody and immediately feel a spark, whether platonic or romantic. what triggers this spark? i would be lying if i said that i do not feel it too. a lot of my longest friendships began with somebody i felt connected to almost immediately, before i knew enough about them to justify the certainty. talking felt smooth, not forced, good.

sometimes these people and i later discover that we have led similar lives, which may explain why we think so similarly and why the spark persists, but how do we come to seek one another out before we know any of that? how do you see one person in a group and somehow know that they are the interesting one? it is the same thing that happens in a class when you look at somebody you have never spoken to and simply assume that you would be friends with them. is it their demeanor? the way they present themselves? something minute that we register before we understand that we have registered it?

perhaps all of this has an entirely material explanation. that does not particularly bother me. in this sense, a soul might not exist in a metaphysical sense as this divine object, but rather as an underlying thing in nature that we cannot put into words.

01 Oct 2026, 18:07

things that i am too cool for

this post is against everything i stand for i hate being too cool for things . tbe coolest thing is to Not be too cool for things. maybe i should just change this post to Things I Think Are Bad

01 Oct 2026, 17:11

27 Sep 2026

lover i

i.
to the gliding, nervous hands at the boston commons, gut twisted, stench of humiliation,
the petrichor, twisted cords, swift goodbyes,
the ‘yes, but i can’t help it,’
the guilt that lingers like an unfinished story, the drunken almost-confession that i did not make,
of which i would later feel the sickly alloy of guilt and relief,
of which would later sit in the cold night and the deadlined basement,
the ruined friendships, the little liturgy of ‘they are all out to get us,’
the meticulous, purposeless destruction, the repercussions

ii.
i find you in the vibrations of the erhu’s strings at the public garden, the cambridge cafe, my yellow pages, my dear palimpsest,
i find you in the steps i tried to retrace when you scribbled your eyes black and ventured out at five in the morning,
i find you on the same train as me,
in our blistered knuckles,
in the fleeting scent,
i find you in my antique infatuation, in my counterfeit actualities, my then, my now, my forever,
i find you in the constellations that i have sought but have never reached,
in the rhapsodies i wanted a wound for, i know, nothing wrong with my bed,
i find you in the air

iii.
in two years' time, everything can be right
but to pass time means to also decay; examine my verdigris
stay with me through it


i loved the crows

27 Sep 2026, 22:58

21 Sep 2026

Marielle and Lucien

As I bleed into Marielle’s grave, I can smell her, or believe that I can, which by now amounts to nearly the same thing, for the rain has softened the new earth beneath my cheek into a black, mucilaginous paste smelling of roots, worms, crushed grass, and flowers already beginning their small putrefactions, yet through that common cemetery effluvium there persists another odor, impossible and unmistakable: orange blossom warmed against skin, stale powder, unwashed hair, old smoke caught in wool, and beneath all of it the faint animal sweetness which collected at the hollow of her throat and which no quantity of soap or lavender water ever entirely abolished.

The knife lies somewhere beside my right hand, half submerged in mud. I had carried it beneath my coat throughout the funeral and, after the last carriage withdrew and the cemetery emptied into rain, I climbed the low wall, found the raw mound beneath which they had put her, and drove the blade beneath my ribs. The first wound seemed insufficient, not from courage but from an almost bureaucratic mistrust of my own body, and thus I struck myself again before the pain had properly arrived. Thereafter came heat, astonishing in its quantity, spreading beneath my shirt and into the waistband of my breeches; then the slower cold, once the cloth had saturated and the rain began thinning whatever reached the ground. I folded myself over her grave and remained there, bleeding into earth which had been closed above her only hours before, possessed by the irrational conviction that if enough of me entered the soil above her the distance between us might diminish by some measurable degree.

Her funeral had taken place that morning. I had not been invited; her mother had seen to that. Thus I watched from beyond the low wall, half concealed by the yews, while the rain soaked through my coat and down into my stockings, and Madame Valette wept into a square of lace and displayed the peculiar efficiency of a person whose grief had inconvenienced but not disorganized her. Between paroxysms she corrected the placement of flowers, reprimanded a servant for allowing mud upon the hem of her dress, drank ratafia, and reminded her sister that several guests would still be arriving afterward for chocolate and cakes. I felt a residual resentment toward her for this facility, for the obscene competence with which she continued existing; Marielle had scarcely been lowered into the ground before her mother was once again concerning herself with pastry.

Perhaps this was unfair. Marielle herself had possessed an appetite under almost every conceivable circumstance, and she had laughed while dying. That, more than the foam, more than the grotesque enlargement of her lips, more even than the convulsions, was what everyone remembered.

She had eaten very little that afternoon: preserved quince, part of a pigeon, a green marchpane perfumed with orange-flower water, several candied violets, and something small and nutty which I cannot now remember and which nobody considered worth remembering at the time. There was no reason to. Marielle herself had apparently never known there existed anything in the world capable of provoking such a rebellion from her own flesh.

Her mouth began to itch. She complained of it once, almost idly, scraping her tongue against her teeth while continuing the conversation; then her lips began to swell, her breathing acquired a damp and narrowing whistle, and within minutes the soft tissues of her face had altered so grotesquely that she appeared to be disappearing beneath a badly made likeness of herself. The physician, when at last he arrived, blamed the humors, then the heat, then some corruption of the stomach, and thereafter suggested that something poisonous might have entered the food. He could no more identify the offending morsel than I could. It might have been the marchpane, the fruit, the confectionery, or something else entirely. Whatever it was had passed harmlessly through every other person at the table and encountered in Marielle some minute, invisible peculiarity which transformed supper into execution.

Albuminous froth gathered at the corners of her mouth. She clawed at her throat until crescents of blood appeared beneath her fingernails. Her heels struck the floorboards with such violence that one shoe flew beneath a cabinet, and the room immediately filled with useless activity: chairs dragged aside, servants running, someone praying, somebody else crying for water, the physician shouting for objects which arrived only after he had forgotten why he wanted them. Through this, Marielle laughed.

Not continuously, for she soon possessed insufficient air even to cough, but in ruined little expulsions between the spasms, wet and strangled noises which everyone else mistook for choking until I saw her eyes and understood that she was genuinely amused. Perhaps she found the physician ridiculous. Perhaps she found all of us ridiculous. Perhaps the absurd spectacle of her own body, which had served her so obligingly in appetite and mischief, suddenly deciding that some negligible ingredient constituted grounds for annihilation appealed to precisely that region of her mind which had always delighted in catastrophe.

I knew her laugh even in that mutilated form. Nine months earlier, she had touched my foot beneath a school table.

Our academy occupied an old house in Paris whose upper rooms had been converted into classrooms, with long scarred tables, copybooks, slate boards, shelves of neglected texts, maps curled brown at the edges, and plaster saints gazing down upon us through generations of chalk dust. We passed our mornings beneath masters who instructed us in Latin, rhetoric, mathematics, drawing, scripture, and such portions of natural philosophy as they themselves could remember, moving from room to room at the sound of a bell and spending an extravagant quantity of our lives amid the composite odor of ink, lamp smoke, sealing wax, wet wool, chalk, and bodies made restless by compulsory stillness.

Marielle sat two places from me. At a distance she possessed a face of almost offensive innocence. Her hair was dirty blond, neither properly gold nor properly brown, with the dull color of straw after rain; her eyelashes were pale, her mouth small, her cheeks round, and she had a baby face which caused strangers to lower their voices around her and older women to presume softness where there was principally appetite. This error generally survived until she spoke.

That morning our master was declining a Latin verb when the toe of her shoe touched mine. I moved my foot aside. Her foot followed. I moved again, supposing that accident had become clumsiness, and again she pursued me, slowly now, deliberately, rubbing the edge of her shoe against my ankle while staring toward the front of the room with such exemplary vacancy that I nearly laughed.

She shifted backward in her chair and gathered a little of her skirt beneath the table, not enough to attract the notice of anyone else but enough that whatever misunderstanding I had been preserving became impossible. A few minutes thereafter she requested permission to leave the room.

I remained at my desk long enough to preserve some nominal appearance of possessing a will independent of hers, though I heard nothing further of the lesson and the letters in my copybook had begun to resemble insects drowned in ink; then I excused myself, crossed the corridor, descended the narrow rear stair, and made my way toward the small privy reserved for the female pupils, where I knew she had gone, and where the air was close and mephitic with damp plaster, lye, old urine, and an heroic quantity of rosewater poured upon the boards in the belief that one odor might assassinate another.

Marielle was waiting against the door, and she quickly seized the front of my coat and pulled me inside.

There was no grace to what followed and very little hesitation. Her mouth struck mine almost painfully; one of my teeth caught her lip, and rather than retreat she bit me back, first softly and then hard enough that the metallic taste of blood entered the kiss. Her fingers worked impatiently at my collar while I pushed aside the satin of her bodice and slipped my hand beneath her chemise. She was slight beneath my hands, her breasts small and unexpectedly soft, the skin there warmer than the rest of her. I bent and drew one nipple between my lips, touched it with my tongue, then caught it lightly with my teeth. A minute sound escaped her.

“Be quiet,” I hushed. Marielle immediately pressed one finger to my mouth instead, as though I were the one making too much noise, holding it there with exaggerated seriousness and mocking the instruction back at me.

My hand then moved beneath her skirts. At first I touched only the inside of her thigh, where the skin was hot and almost indecently soft; then my finger traveled higher and found her already wet. She drew a short breath through her nose as I touched her more deliberately, one hand gripping my shoulder while I worked my fingers against her until her breathing became uneven and she had to press her lips tightly together to keep from making noise.

Then I felt something warmer and more viscous across my fingertips.

I withdrew my hand at once.

Blood.

For an instant I thought I had torn her somehow. The sight of it upon my fingers produced such immediate alarm that Marielle, seeing my expression, looked down and began to laugh.

“It is mine,” she whispered.

The blood had already darkened the linen between her thighs. She took my wrist before I could wipe my hand and examined my fingers with an almost scholarly curiosity; then, without explanation, she pressed them against her own cheek.

I drew the red downward.

There she stood with her baby face flushed, dirty-blond hair loosening at the temples, one side of her bodice disordered and menstrual blood drawn across her cheek with the solemnity of rouge, and the contradiction was so complete that she resembled one of those little painted virgins in country churches after vandals have got at them: innocence preserved in the features and profanation applied afterward.

Whatever restraint remained between us became largely theoretical.

I pressed her backward against the partition and gathered her skirts higher. Up close there rose from her that peculiar sickly sweetness I would thereafter associate with her body—powder and perspiration, stale perfume, something faintly sour beneath it, like fruit kept one day beyond ripeness. When I entered her she tightened abruptly around me, and for an instant both of us became completely still.

Then she shifted her hips toward mine. I began slowly, conscious of every betraying sound: leather moving against the boards, our clothes rasping together, the slight percussion of the partition behind her, and above all our breathing, which seemed impossibly loud in that little room. Marielle gave a small involuntary moan and immediately covered her own mouth. I thrust again. She breathed through her nose, quick and shallow, trying unsuccessfully not to make another sound.

Caution deteriorated rapidly thereafter. My thrusts became harder; she caught my hair in one hand and bit the cloth at my shoulder, producing little muffled breaths whenever the movement drove her more firmly against the wall. Once, the boards knocked loudly enough that we both froze. Footsteps passed somewhere beyond the corridor. Marielle looked at me, eyes wide, and began silently laughing. Then she pulled me back against her.

The confined air became rank with us. Her menstrual blood slicked my hand and the inside of her thighs; its metallic odor mingled with sweat, damp linen, old urine, the useless rosewater on the floorboards, and the warm animal smell of our bodies until nothing in that little room possessed a separate scent any longer.

Near the end, her breathing changed. The small suppressed sounds became quicker, almost irritated; she caught my shoulder between her teeth while her body tightened rhythmically around me. I felt her climax begin and, almost simultaneously, lost whatever control remained to me. I ejaculated inside her as she contracted around me, both of us attempting absurdly to remain quiet through it, her forehead pressed against my neck and one final little moan escaping before she could swallow it.

For several moments afterward neither of us moved. My hand was sticky with blood; between us, sweat had mingled with it, and the smell of iron persisted most strongly, though beneath it remained the cloying sweetness of her skin. Marielle looked down at the mess between us and smiled with evident satisfaction, then she straightened her clothes with astonishing composure.

She washed her face badly. A rust-colored crescent remained beneath one ear throughout the next lesson, which I found so distracting that I was twice reprimanded for staring at her.

Our courtship, if one insists upon calling it that, thereafter proceeded largely by the destruction of ordinary distinctions. We stole for one another, lied for one another, disappeared into empty classrooms, stairwells, gardens, borrowed chambers, and carriages, and interpreted almost every attempt at correction as evidence of a general conspiracy against us.

Once Marielle concealed a bottle of eau-de-vie beneath her cloak in a wine merchant’s shop and had nearly reached the street when the proprietor seized her wrist and called her a thief, then a whore, then several further things which were probably accurate only in spirit.

I was standing beside a large cask raised upon wooden trestles. Its tap projected toward the aisle at about the height of my knee, and before I had considered the consequences with any seriousness I wrenched it loose.

The wine came out with astonishing force. It struck the floorboards in a thick red stream and spread almost immediately beneath the merchant’s shoes, running into the cracks between the planks and gathering in dark pools around the legs of tables. For one peculiar instant the shop appeared to have been wounded. The color was too rich, too bodily; it moved with the sluggish shine of blood, carrying dust, cork fragments, and bits of straw along with it as it advanced toward the doorway.

The proprietor released Marielle with a cry and lunged for the cask, both hands attempting uselessly to force the tap back into place while the wine continued pouring over his wrists and cuffs. I shoved a narrow rack beside me and sent several bottles onto the floor. Glass burst everywhere. One bottle shattered against the wall and left a red fan across the plaster; another broke beneath a customer’s shoe, scattering green splinters through the wine so that the floor glittered beneath the spreading crimson. Someone slipped and caught himself against a shelf, which sent still more bottles crashing down. The noise multiplied obscenely: breaking glass, shouting, the hollow knocking of casks, the merchant swearing as the wine ran between his fingers faster than he could stop it.

Within seconds the whole shop had become a small catastrophe of red liquid and broken glass. Wine soaked the hems of skirts, darkened shoes, splashed the legs of chairs, and ran in narrow rivulets toward the street. The smell was enormous—fermented fruit, wet wood, spirits, smoke from the lamps, and the sharp mineral odor of shattered glass and dust. People were trying simultaneously to save the stock, avoid falling, and determine who had caused the destruction, which meant that nobody was accomplishing any of these things particularly well.

Marielle remained where she was for perhaps half a second, watching the ruin with a look of almost devotional attention. Then she remembered that she was the reason any of it was happening.

She clutched the stolen bottle more tightly beneath her cloak, stepped directly through the red wash flooding the floor, and disappeared into the street.

I followed a moment later with wine soaking the soles of my shoes and fragments of glass cracking beneath them.

I found her several streets away, bent almost double against a wall and hiccupping with laughter, one hand still wrapped around the stolen bottle. There was a splash of red wine across the pale front of her dress which, at a distance, looked very much like blood.

Thereafter her family concluded, not without evidence, that she required correction.

Madame Valette came to the academy herself. She did not make a scene there; she reserved scenes for private places. She took Marielle home in a closed carriage, and two days later arrangements were made for her confinement in a private house beyond the denser streets of the city, one of those establishments in which troublesome sons and daughters, melancholics, blasphemers, people afflicted with visions, people afflicted with inconvenient appetites, and persons whose families had simply ceased knowing what to do with them could be subjected to physicians, clerics, cold water, discipline, confinement, and the improving influence of locked doors.

I endured twelve days without her.

On the thirteenth I concocted a plan to join her.

The matter required some study. I could hardly arrive at the gate and request incarceration on romantic grounds, and therefore I first learned what accusations had persuaded Madame Valette to surrender her daughter: agitation, impiety, nocturnal wandering, violence, certain “unnatural excitements” which the physician declined to describe in respectable company. Thereafter I began manufacturing my own derangement with care.

I stopped sleeping where servants could observe me. I refused meat because I claimed slaughtered animals continued speaking from the plate. I informed our priest that Saint Denis had taken residence in the chimney and delivered instructions whenever the wind came from the east. I spent an entire supper staring into a candle because I said another sun had been imprisoned inside the flame, and at three in the morning allowed my mother to find me barefoot in the courtyard kneeling before a dead shrub which I addressed as the Virgin.

The performance disturbed my parents principally because they could not determine when it had begun. My father questioned me; I answered him with fragments from scripture rearranged until they meant nothing. My mother touched my forehead repeatedly, hoping perhaps that fever would make the entire affair ordinary.

Finally a physician was summoned.

He asked whether I heard voices.

I told him constantly.

He asked what they said.

I informed him that God had entrusted me with certain instructions concerning the churches of Paris, though I had been forbidden to reveal them before the appointed hour.

The physician leaned forward.

“And what is to happen at this appointed hour?”

I told him that I could not say without placing both our souls in danger.

“Do they command you to harm anyone?”

I lowered my voice and told him that the saints had not yet decided whom God required.

His pen began moving at once.

I understood then that my madness was becoming credible.

Within the week I was sent to the same house in which Marielle had been confined.

She did not know I was coming. I first saw her across the chapel, separated from me by an aisle and several attendants. She lifted her eyes during prayer, found me among the figures opposite her, and thereafter held her thumb beneath her lower lip so hard that the flesh whitened around it. Her expression otherwise did not change.

That night somebody scratched three times against the wall adjoining my room.

Thereafter the institution became merely another building in which we were obliged to discover one another. We met behind the laundry, beneath staircases, in storage rooms and unused corridors, and most often near the bathing rooms after the attendants had gone, where steam remained trapped against the stone and the smell of soap, minerals, and damp skin lingered in the air. We kissed beside the great copper tubs with our clothes still half wet from washing; we passed notes through cracks in masonry; once she folded a ribbon she had worn around her throat into one of my clean shirts in the laundry, knowing I would recognize it by the orange-flower perfume and the faint smell of her skin.

There was also Odette. Odette belonged to the women’s side of the house and had black hair so glossy it appeared almost blue beneath lamplight. She fastened it tightly behind her head, giving her otherwise handsome face a severe, somewhat wounded expression. I had spoken with her perhaps half a dozen times, generally after chapel or while waiting outside the physician’s room. She was clever in a dry way, and I laughed with her easily enough.

Marielle noticed every conversation, and she soon began referring to Odette as your widow, a phrase whose origin neither of us could explain, and watched her thereafter with the meticulous hostility ordinarily reserved for an insect one intends eventually to crush.

One night I woke and found Marielle standing beside my bed. Her linen chemise had been torn loose at one shoulder. Blood had dried beneath her nose and across her chin in almost black scales; one eye had begun to swell, her bare feet were filthy from the corridor, and her hands shook without cessation. From the wet linen between her thighs came the acrid ammoniac odor which told me, before she admitted it, that she had pissed herself. She had fought Odette.

The quarrel, as Marielle later related it, had begun because Odette caught her staring and finally asked whether she intended to glare at her until one of them died. Marielle replied with something obscene. Odette laughed and told her that perhaps she ought to worry less about other women and more about whether I would eventually grow tired of being guarded like stolen property.

Marielle told her to be quiet, and Odette did not.

She said I came to speak with her willingly when Marielle was elsewhere. She said I laughed with her. Then she claimed that I had once told her Marielle would exhaust herself, and probably me as well, before winter.

Whether I ever said precisely this I cannot now remember. I may have said something near enough to it that Odette found the alteration irresistible — Marielle struck her.

Odette, who was taller, stronger, and apparently more competent at violence, struck back with greater effect. What followed was an ugly confusion of fingers, hair, teeth, linen, blood, and panic. By the time the attendants separated them, Marielle had split Odette’s lip with her teeth, torn a black handful of hair from somewhere above her ear, bitten through the inside of her own cheek, and become so frightened by the violence she herself had initiated that her bladder emptied down her legs. She recounted all this with a curious precision, almost as though giving evidence against herself.

Then she asked whether Odette had told the truth.

“Which part?”

“That you like speaking to her.”

I told her that I sometimes spoke to Odette because we lived in the same building and possessed language.

Marielle stared at me.

I told her, more plainly, that I did not want Odette.

“And did you say I exhaust you?”

I considered lying, decided uncertainty was safer, and told her that if I had said it I had meant only that loving her required more energy than most occupations.

This was apparently acceptable.

Some of the rigidity went out of her body at once. She looked suddenly exhausted, very small beneath the torn linen and dried blood, and embarrassed now in a way I had rarely seen her embarrassed by anything. The bravado had gone out of her. She would not look directly at me; she kept rubbing one dirty bare foot over the other and tugging uselessly at the wet linen clinging between her thighs, as though she might somehow conceal from me the fact that she had been frightened enough to piss herself.

I loved her terribly then.

Not because she had attacked Odette—there was nothing especially admirable in that—but because beneath all the spectacle she had come to me frightened and ashamed, carrying the childish certainty that one conversation with another woman might cause me to cease loving her. Marielle, who could steal without remorse, lie without preparation, bite through another person’s lip and laugh while adults shouted at her, had been reduced by jealousy to this trembling, sweet, mortified creature standing beside my bed and waiting to learn whether she had finally made herself unbearable.

She had not.

I pulled her beneath the blankets with me.

For a while she resisted being held, principally because she was conscious of the smell of urine and kept apologizing for it in increasingly irritated whispers. Eventually exhaustion defeated embarrassment. She folded herself against my chest, put her face beneath my chin, and permitted me to hold her there.

I remember the weight of her more clearly than almost anything else from that night. Her body gradually ceased trembling; her breathing lengthened; occasionally she made a small congested sound because the blood drying beneath her nose made breathing difficult. I stroked the dirty-blond hair away from her face and watched the swollen eye darken by degrees. She looked very young in appearance when she slept, the babyish roundness returning as soon as her expressions stopped interfering with it, and this made the dried blood across her mouth seem somehow more obscene.

I held her until the urine-soaked linen had gone cold against us, until the blood from her cheek had transferred itself to my pillow, and until the institution settled into that peculiar nocturnal silence belonging to places where many people sleep behind locked doors.

We were discovered at dawn. Marielle received the punishment first. Two matrons took her to the disciplinary room, removed her outer clothes, leaving only her linen chemise, bent her across a padded bench, and birched the backs of her thighs and buttocks until the skin rose in parallel welts. I heard several of the strokes from the corridor. She refused them the satisfaction of crying loudly. My own punishment was three days in isolation on bread, broth, and water, with the shutters fastened and every removable object taken from the room.

When I saw Marielle again, she lowered herself into a chair with exquisite caution and informed me that we were leaving. We had already spoken for weeks about running away together, though our plans possessed approximately the economic sophistication one might expect from two people who believed sheets tied into knots constituted transportation. Marielle proposed Lyon once and Rouen twice; I preferred anywhere reached by enough roads that nobody could retrieve us before supper. We imagined cheap rooms, false names, mornings in which neither of us would be accounted for by anybody, and possessed not the slightest sensible notion of what any of these things cost.

Thus escape ceased to be one of our private fantasies and became an undertaking. We stole sheets from the laundry and spent two nights knotting and testing them. On the third, while evening prayers occupied most of the attendants, we fastened the resulting rope to an iron bedstead beneath an upper window and began descending.

The operation was humiliatingly difficult. The knots tightened beneath our weight until they burned the palms; lime and stone scraped skin from my knuckles; Marielle lost one shoe somewhere between the second floor and the ground, and halfway down an attendant opened a neighboring window, understood at once what the dangling sheets signified, and began shouting that two patients were escaping. Other windows opened. Faces appeared against dark glass and between shutters; somebody began ringing a bell; doors slammed somewhere inside the building. Marielle, hanging below me with her hair loose and one stocking torn, looked upward and began laughing so violently that I had to hiss at her to keep moving before she brought us both down. We reached the ground, crossed the garden, climbed the wall badly, and ran until neither of us possessed enough breath for speech.

For several hours we believed ourselves magnificently free. By the time darkness had properly settled, however, the defects in our plan had become difficult to ignore. Between us we possessed a handful of livres and smaller coins, my coat, one stolen comb, Marielle’s remaining shoe, and no dependable means of acquiring anything else. A room required money. Food required money. Coaches required quantities which seemed personally insulting. We walked until the streets became unfamiliar and then discovered that unfamiliarity itself was expensive. By morning we were wet, hungry, exhausted, and arguing over whether purchasing bread constituted extravagance.

The grand scheme of another city contracted first into another district, thereafter into the possibility of sleeping in a stable, and finally into the humiliating recognition that we had prepared admirably for leaving the house and scarcely at all for remaining gone. We returned separately.

Marielle’s return produced the greater spectacle. Madame Valette had learned of the escape before midnight. The house of confinement had dispatched a messenger almost as soon as the alarm was raised that patients were escaping, and by morning she had servants, acquaintances, and one particularly useless cousin searching roads in several directions. Consequently, when Marielle finally appeared at home in one shoe, mud to her knees, and with the expression of somebody returning late from an inconvenient errand, her mother had already passed through terror and arrived at fury.

She seized Marielle by both shoulders, kissed her forehead, struck her once across the cheek, then embraced her so violently that Marielle complained she could not breathe. Wicked, diseased, ungrateful, beloved, impossible—Madame Valette called her all of these things in such rapid succession that the words ceased to contradict one another. Marielle was confined to her room for several days, deprived of visitors, watched by servants, and thereafter permitted downstairs only under supervision. Yet beneath all the punishment there remained unmistakable relief. Madame Valette had recovered her catastrophe. The household could once again arrange itself around her.

My own return was considerably less theatrical, though the news had preceded me as well. A messenger from the institution had arrived at my parents’ house during the night with the information that I and another patient had escaped by an upper window. By morning the story had already enlarged in transmission: we had stolen horses; we had assaulted an attendant; Marielle was pregnant; I had set fire to the laundry. None of these things was true, which scarcely mattered. Servants had heard. Neighbors had heard the servants. Relations began making inquiries with the false delicacy peculiar to people who already know the answer and wish chiefly to hear you lie about it.

Thus when I came home, wet, hungry, mud dried to my stockings, I did not encounter surprise. I encountered the exhausted aftermath of several hours in which my parents had already imagined my corpse in every ditch between Paris and whatever imaginary province Marielle and I had intended to conquer.

“Was any of it true?”

I knew immediately what he meant.

I told him no.

My mother stopped eating.

He asked whether I had fabricated the voices, Saint Denis, the messages from God, the business with the candle, the kneeling in the courtyard—everything—in order to be sent to the same institution as Marielle.

I admitted that I had.

My father looked down at his plate.

My mother asked whether I understood what I had done to them, though by them she did not mean merely herself and my father. She meant the family entire: the name, the household, the servants who had seen physicians coming and going, the acquaintances who now knew their son had been shut in a madhouse, the relations to whom carefully incomplete explanations had been supplied, and now the additional humiliation of my having escaped from the place in company with a young woman whose own family was already spoken about with sufficient interest. Madness, had it been genuine, might at least have been pitied. There were prescribed expressions for misfortune. One could lower one’s voice, mention illness, permit people to call the whole thing tragic. Fraud offered no such courtesy. One could hardly send calling cards explaining that the family lunatic had only been pretending.

They had already paid the physician, endured the humiliation of my confinement, received notice of my escape, and spent a night wondering whether I had drowned in a ditch somewhere between Paris and whatever imaginary province Marielle and I had intended to conquer. Added to this was the slower injury of gossip, which had already carried the story beyond our household and would presumably continue improving it in our absence. My mother seemed less frightened by any single rumor than by the prospect that our name might remain attached to all of them after the truth itself had ceased to interest anyone.

My father asked what precisely I imagined would become of me if I continued arranging my life according to Marielle’s catastrophes. I had no useful answer.

For several days they addressed me with baffled caution and a sort of mortified civility, as though I were both their son and an embarrassing guest whose departure date remained uncertain. My mother asked whether I had eaten. My father asked whether I intended to return to the academy. Neither asked whether I regretted anything, perhaps because the answer was visible enough.

Then the disturbance simply thinned out. Meals resumed. Servants stopped watching me. My father returned to his papers. My mother ceased examining my face for evidence of another religious revelation. They did not forgive me so much as grow tired of maintaining the degree of attention required for anger. This was considerably less satisfying than punishment.

Marielle’s family punished her because they remained furiously invested in what she might become. Mine appeared chiefly relieved that I had returned alive, ashamed of the spectacle, and thereafter anxious to make the entire affair socially nonexistent.

Marielle and I resumed seeing one another secretly.

Nine months is not a long life when measured by ordinary arithmetic, yet ours seemed to contain an extravagant quantity of existence. There had been a world before Marielle and then a world whose geography had reorganized itself around her: school corridors, wine shops, the house of confinement, alleys, gardens, all acquiring significance according to whether she had once stood there, laughed there, bled there, stolen something there, or dragged me by the sleeve into some new stupidity.

Then came the afternoon with the preserved fruit and the green confectionery and the physician who arrived too late.

Now, lying upon the grave with rain entering my collar and my blood sinking through the new earth, I remember not merely her face but the succession of odors by which I knew her: powder in her hair, smoke caught in her sleeves, the iron sweetness of menstrual blood in the school privy, wet linen beside the bathing room, urine and dried blood on the night she came to my bed, orange-flower water her mother insisted she wear, and finally that strange saccharine breath in the minutes before her throat closed.

I press my face farther into the soil until grains collect against my teeth.

The physician called her death an internal corruption because he possessed no better language for it. Perhaps explanations are frequently no more than this: respectable names applied afterward to events which have already refused to be understood. He had his humors, his stomach, his poison. I have a green confection, an unremembered ingredient, and Marielle laughing through a throat which was killing her.

What actually happened remains disorderly. She ate something harmless to everyone else; her lips swelled; her tongue became useless; she clawed crescents into her own neck; foam collected at her mouth; she laughed because something about our horror amused her; thereafter men put her into a coffin, Madame Valette organized refreshments, and I spent the afternoon carrying a knife beneath my coat while pretending not to know what I intended to do with it.

By evening I knew.

The blood beneath me has grown cold enough that I can no longer distinguish it from rainwater except when another little warmth escapes the wounds. I think of all the places into which I followed Marielle simply because she had gone first: a privy, a wine shop, a madhouse, streets for which we possessed no money and no plan. There was, in retrospect, very little in our nine months together which I had not treated as an invitation to follow.

Her grave merely presented the first invitation for which there was no ordinary entrance.

21 Sep 2026, 11:55

19 Sep 2026

the libertine circle

strictly speaking, the beat generation was not a school but a name applied afterward to a network of writers whose friendships preceded the work now grouped under it. allen ginsberg was principally a poet; jack kerouac and william s. burroughs were prose writers. they found one another in new york during the 1940s, before the books that later made them appear as a coherent movement. what looks unified in retrospect began as a set of personal relationships.

i started with howl. ginsberg first read the poem publicly in san francisco in 1955, and city lights published it the following year. from howl i watched kill your darlings, which concerns ginsberg's earlier years at columbia and the killing of david kammerer by lucien carr. that led to burroughs; burroughs led to queer; queer returned me to anthony bourdain's episode in tangier; bourdain led to paul bowles. i was fortunate enough to get a copy of bowles's the sheltering sky recently at harvard book store, and by then the sequence had ceased to feel arbitrary.

none of this began as research. once i wanted to combine it into some form of writing, however, the difference between recollection and fact became troublesome. films had altered my memory of events. details had migrated from one person to another. a few things i knew with considerable confidence turned out not to have happened at all. hence the internet rabbit hole, followed almost immediately by a reading rabbit hole. fact-checking did not dilute the story. the corrections usually made the chronology less tidy and the relationships more difficult to simplify. what follows is the record i ended up with.

before there was a “beat generation,” there was lucien carr. carr met ginsberg at columbia and subsequently introduced him to kerouac and burroughs. the association looks inevitable only in retrospect. at the time, no such coherence was apparent; the association was still provisional, acquiring its shape only as the people involved became increasingly entangled in one another's lives.

ginsberg fell deeply in love with carr. the columbia account has them first connecting over brahms, after which carr's ideas about literature began to acquire unusual authority for him. ginsberg later called carr his “ideal image of virtue and awareness.” the intellectual attachment cannot be very cleanly separated from the erotic one. carr's ideas mattered partly because carr mattered.

homosexuality therefore belongs near the beginning of the history rather than appearing later as one of the subjects of howl. desire already affected the friendships from which the writing emerged. who attracted whom could alter whose company was sought, whose ideas were taken seriously, and which relationships acquired an intensity disproportionate to an ordinary literary acquaintance. such distinctions become somewhat arbitrary when desire itself helps determine whose ideas acquire authority.

ginsberg called this early social world the “libertine circle.” “beat generation” belongs to the later history, when the books had been published and a movement could be attributed to their authors. the earlier phrase describes something less discrete. they were reading one another with a seriousness that could become almost religious; increasingly, drugs offered another route toward the altered consciousness they were already seeking in literature. the literary and the ecstatic were never wholly separate projects.

one of my false memories came directly from kill your darlings. the film has ginsberg and the others break into columbia's restricted library collection and rearrange its displays. at some point i stopped remembering this merely as a scene and began remembering it as an event. repeated attempts to locate the historical library raid produced nothing. the film's production material finally supplied the explanation: krokidas and bunn drew the sequence partly from their own experiences in college. i had been searching ginsberg's biography for something contributed by the screenwriters. (beautiful cinematography is, perhaps, a poor archival method.)

accounts of david kammerer diverge almost immediately. kammerer knew carr long before columbia. he had been carr's adult scoutmaster in st. louis while carr was still a boy, became intensely attached to him, and continued appearing in carr's life as carr moved through a succession of schools. by the time they were both in new york, carr was nineteen and kammerer was thirty-three.

kill your darlings both corrects an injustice and risks committing another one. after kammerer's death, carr's story was that an older homosexual predator had pursued him until he finally defended himself. the film is deeply suspicious of that account. krokidas and bunn have explained that in researching the murder they encountered people who remembered the later relationship as much more reciprocal than carr subsequently admitted; in their version, carr sometimes returns to kammerer even when kammerer is trying to separate himself. this matters because kammerer spent decades in the story as little more than the threatening homosexual whose own murder could be explained by his sexuality. the film restores a person where the legal narrative had produced a type.

yet the film's revision introduces a different simplification. in the film the relationship becomes something like a doomed romance, and it becomes very easy to forget where it began. kammerer first knew carr as an adult scoutmaster who had authority over a boy. whatever carr felt when he was nineteen does not travel backward through time and make that origin disappear. there is no need to choose between the later ambiguity and the earlier imbalance of power; the evidence permits both. the film is right to reject the homophobic caricature through which kammerer was reduced to a type, but that correction need not soften the predatory origin of his pursuit of carr. carr's later reciprocation complicates the relationship without erasing the fact that kammerer first attached himself to carr as an adult scoutmaster while carr was still a child. the distortion in the legal story lay elsewhere: homophobia made kammerer's sexuality, rather than the history of that pursuit, the fact through which his death was interpreted.

in august 1944 carr and kammerer went to riverside park after drinking together. carr later said that kammerer made an unwanted sexual advance and that a fight followed. he stabbed kammerer twice with an old boy scout knife, weighted the body, and put it into the hudson. afterward he went to burroughs, who advised him to get a lawyer and surrender. carr instead found kerouac, who accompanied him while he disposed of the knife and some of kammerer's belongings. once carr confessed, burroughs and kerouac were arrested as material witnesses.

the knife had survived from the same boy scout world in which kammerer first knew carr as a child. years later it became the murder weapon. the association between the beginning of their relationship and its end was therefore not supplied afterward by a novelist or filmmaker; it was already present in the object itself.

i had also remembered that carr somehow escaped murder through a bizarre law which essentially allowed somebody to kill a gay man who propositioned him. this is not quite what happened. carr was charged with second-degree murder, but the case was publicly interpreted through the idea of the respectable young man defending himself from a homosexual predator. the language later used for this was an “honor slaying” or homosexual-panic defense. prosecutors allowed carr to plead to manslaughter, and he served eighteen months at elmira. there was no magical line in the statute announcing that homosexual victims counted less. hence the more disturbing point: there did not need to be one. prejudice was already operating in the question of which account of the killing sounded plausible, and whose fear was permitted to explain whose death.

after the killing, ginsberg occupied an especially painful position. he had been in love with carr and was also close to kammerer; joyce johnson's reconstruction of the period even raises the possibility that he experimented sexually with both men. (may have: the surviving evidence does not justify anything stronger.) kammerer was dead and carr went to prison. whatever had existed among the three of them could no longer be clarified by the people involved. afterward, the relationship could only be reconstructed from records produced for very different purposes.

the disagreement over carr and kammerer is partly a disagreement between records created under different conditions. carr's account after the killing had an immediate legal purpose: his description of kammerer could affect how his own violence was judged. ginsberg's private writing had no such function and could register desires that he would not have described in the same terms to columbia officials or psychiatrists. later memoirs were written after homosexuality had become more publicly speakable, though not necessarily easier to remember accurately. hence the surviving record is uneven. the sources do not merely contradict one another; they preserve versions of the relationship shaped by what could safely or usefully be said at the time.

within a year of kammerer's death, ginsberg was himself in disciplinary trouble at columbia. the episode is easy to confuse with the much later obscenity history of howl, but the poem did not yet exist. in 1945 ginsberg was suspended after writing an obscenity in the grime on his dormitory window; kerouac had also been discovered staying in his room. ginsberg later insisted that nothing sexual had happened between them, but the suspicion surrounding two men sharing a bed belonged to the disciplinary atmosphere anyway. he eventually returned and graduated.

the drug history belongs partly to this early period as well, although not in the form i had absorbed from kill your darlings. i had constructed a college tableau in which ginsberg and kammerer were continually taking enormous quantities of drugs together; i cannot substantiate that particular image. ginsberg's documented use over the following years is considerable enough without embellishment: marijuana, benzedrine and other amphetamines, peyote, lsd, psilocybin, and yagé. he later associated part of howl with peyote, kaddish with amphetamines, and “wales — a visitation” with lsd. older ginsberg became less persuaded that chemical intensity was valuable in itself and increasingly compared drugs with meditation and yoga. the question shifted from how radically consciousness could be altered to what, if anything, an altered state could leave behind once it ended.

neal cassady entered the circle at the end of 1946 and soon became ginsberg's lover. kerouac, meanwhile, was transforming cassady into the figure who would become dean moriarty in on the road. cassady's life consequently entered the beat record through two very different attachments: ginsberg's desire for him and kerouac's attempt to render him in fiction. neither relationship was incidental to the later literature.

in 1949 ginsberg entered the new york state psychiatric institute after an episode involving herbert huncke and stolen property. he remained there for about eight months and met carl solomon, to whom howl would later be dedicated. the psychiatric world of the poem therefore had a literal institutional antecedent: one of the people to whom the poem speaks was someone ginsberg first knew while confined there.

the much longer psychiatric history of ginsberg's mother, naomi, later became central to kaddish. “madness” is especially easy to romanticize when the beats are read retrospectively, and institutionalization itself can become part of that romance: evidence of extremity or artistic authenticity. for ginsberg it also meant submitting to institutions with the authority to name an experience and determine how much control a person retained over his own life. that coercive dimension belongs beside, rather than in opposition to, the visionary language of the poems.

in 1953 burroughs stayed with ginsberg in his lower east side apartment after returning from south america. the photographs ginsberg took during those months preserve the domestic scale of the relationship particularly well. decades later he captioned one photograph of burroughs on the roof with the explanation that “we were lovers those months.” another shows burroughs lying in ginsberg's bedroom with junky nearby. ginsberg remembered returning from his newspaper job and talking with him late into the night, describing the attachment as a “great psychic marriage.” they were lovers while manuscripts were passing between them; the intimacy and the writing developed under the same conditions.

in december 1954 ginsberg met peter orlovsky in san francisco. they became lovers, moved in together, and understood the relationship as a marriage; despite periods of separation, it lasted until ginsberg's death. the chronology is useful precisely because it prevents a causal claim. orlovsky did not somehow produce howl, and some of the experiences and images from which the poem emerged already belonged to ginsberg's earlier life. but orlovsky entered that life before howl's first public reading and publication. by the time ginsberg became publicly identified with a poem unusually frank about homosexuality, he was also beginning a durable homosexual domestic life rather than merely writing retrospectively about frustrated or secret attachments.

howl was first read publicly in san francisco in 1955 and published by city lights in 1956. i had another false memory here: something about ginsberg being forced to redact carr's name from a poem, together with a phrase like “skeptical lovers” apparently supplied by nobody. the actual dispute concerned the dedication. carr was named in the first printing of howl and other poems, but by then he had spent years trying to prevent the 1944 killing and his place in beat history from defining his public identity. he asked ginsberg to remove him from later printings, and ginsberg did.

ginsberg then continued turning the relationship between private life and public authority into an actual political life. he became deeply involved in antiwar protest and was tear-gassed in chicago during the 1968 democratic convention. he spoke publicly about homosexuality when doing so still carried considerably more institutional risk than it later would. he opposed censorship and marijuana criminalization; years later he and peter orlovsky were arrested during an antinuclear protest at rocky flats. cuba expelled him after he criticized its treatment of gay people. czechoslovakia expelled him soon afterward after students elected him king of may. there is something almost procedural about this part of his biography: ginsberg enters an institution's field of vision, speaks rather more freely than the institution would prefer, and eventually somebody decides that allen ginsberg should probably leave.

the burroughs part of the story is where my rabbit hole left new york. i am currently in the process of reading naked lunch, but before that i saw luca guadagnino's queer. i thought it was beautiful, particularly because it renders burroughs's all-consuming desire and loneliness without turning him into a permanently composed icon of transgression. this sent me back into his biography.

burroughs had a serious narcotics addiction long before tangier. morphine and heroin recur through his life and through his writing about addiction. before tangier, however, there was mexico city and joan vollmer. in 1951 burroughs shot and killed vollmer during the drunken william tell episode in which a glass was placed on her head. he later altered parts of his account, and the event accumulated its own mythology, but the basic fact remains horribly simple: he pointed a loaded gun toward her head and fired.

the connection between queer and joan's death is stronger than the plot alone would suggest. burroughs wrote the manuscript in the aftermath of the 1951 shooting, but the shooting itself never appears as an episode in the novel. when queer was finally published decades later, burroughs said in his introduction that joan's death had “motivated and formulated” his writing. the event is therefore absent from the narrative while remaining explicit in burroughs's later account of why the book exists.

the novel turns instead toward lee's obsessive pursuit of allerton, his loneliness, and his increasingly desperate wish to achieve some form of contact with another person. burroughs later described joan's death through the “ugly spirit,” an invasive force which he believed had brought him into a lifelong struggle with possession and control. the language is metaphysical, but it also displaces agency: an inward conflict becomes an external force capable of acting upon him. joan's death remains central even as responsibility is narrated through a cosmology of possession.

guadagnino's film makes the connection which the novel leaves unspoken considerably more visible. its final surreal sequence invents a william tell tableau in which lee shoots eugene, directly recalling the circumstances of joan vollmer's death. that scene is not in burroughs's novel. the filmmakers deliberately threaded the real shooting into the adaptation, so the ending is indeed a reference to joan. in that respect the film adapts not merely the plot of queer, but burroughs's later explanation of what had been haunting the book from outside its narrative.

then comes tangier. burroughs settled there during the 1950s and spent part of the period in severe heroin addiction. much of what eventually became naked lunch existed first as routines and fragments sent in letters to ginsberg. in 1957 ginsberg and kerouac arrived and helped type and organize the material. the columbia archive still has the manuscripts and correspondence. i like this because naked lunch can seem, while reading it, like an object that simply erupted out of one person's damaged consciousness. materially it was also paper being passed between friends while they tried to work out what kind of book they had in front of them.

anthony bourdain is partly responsible for why this version of tangier stayed in my head. i went back to his parts unknown episode while writing this because i had misremembered one story as belonging to bourdain himself. it was burroughs. during his worst period of addiction in tangier, burroughs described barely leaving his room and eventually having his utilities shut off because he had stopped paying for them. bourdain reads the account in the episode and calls burroughs one of his heroes.

(there is also a poem in my notebook section which references anthony bourdain; it predates this particular tangier rabbit hole.)

the same episode led me toward paul bowles. bourdain arrives in tangier already aware that he is entering a city americans have spent decades turning into a literary idea. bowles is central to that idea because he actually made a long life there rather than merely passing through it. reading the sheltering sky has given me another route into tangier, apart from the version of the city i first encountered through burroughs and bourdain. by then the chain itself had become interesting.

some of this rabbit hole also entered a short work of fiction i started to write called the faraday train. the protagonist had once lived in tangier and reflects on that period after moving away. he remembers using copious amounts of kief, which bourdain discusses in parts unknown, and spending days in his room while the electricity went unpaid. he also remembers sitting beneath a triptych painting while a man in his apartment, absurdly intoxicated, had blood covering his face. the image later recurs in his dreams. that scene was consciously indebted to burroughs, particularly his use of grotesque, drug-saturated imagery that proceeds according to something closer to the logic of memory or nightmare than ordinary explanation.

years before the train journey, the protagonist had also betrayed another man. i had settled on the precise betrayal while writing it but have since forgotten the details; i believe drugs in tangier were involved and that the other man nearly died. years later, he finds the protagonist again and offers him an unknown drug without identifying himself. the protagonist thinks he looks vaguely familiar, takes it anyway, and gets on the train, where he begins hallucinating and eventually overdoses. i remember getting stalled on some of the mechanics of the revenge and will have to consult my old notes if i ever return to it. i mention the story mostly because it records one place this particular rabbit hole led me. the revenge in the faraday train is deliberate and retrospective; reading about carr complicated that category rather than supplying a model for it. carr's violence cannot be separated neatly from kammerer's long pursuit of him, which is perhaps why the case kept entering my thoughts about a story i had already begun.

elsewhere in the beat circle, the entanglement was less about revenge than about love and literature occupying the same relationships. ginsberg did not encounter carr at a professional distance and subsequently borrow some of his ideas; he loved him. burroughs and ginsberg exchanged manuscripts while also sharing an apartment and, for a period, a bed. literary influence was therefore not something occurring separately from intimacy. the people reading and revising one another were often also the people sleeping together, desiring one another, or arranging their ordinary lives around one another.

ginsberg's photographs preserve that scale particularly well. burroughs waits in a bedroom for him to come home from work; kerouac walks down east seventh street while ginsberg follows with a camera. the captions were written much later, after the people in the photographs had become literary figures, but they repeatedly return to ordinary circumstances: who was staying where, who was sleeping with whom, what they were reading, and what they said to one another.

none of this converts the violence and grief surrounding these relationships into literary romance. kammerer's death is not redeemed by the books his friends later wrote, and joan vollmer's death acquires no compensating meaning from burroughs's subsequent career. the writing instead preserves traces of the relationships around these events, including relationships that would otherwise be difficult to reconstruct at all.

their proximity left unusually dense records. writing became one means by which people continued to exist inside one another's lives after the circumstances themselves had changed. carr's request to be removed from the dedication changed later printings, but the earlier documents continued to record his place in the circle. burroughs's unfinished work passed through the hands of people who were also friends and lovers. private attachments consequently survived in public literature long after the relationships themselves had altered or ended.

“beat generation” consequently names more than the books usually gathered beneath it. it also refers to a social world recorded while the people inside it were still becoming themselves, before later biography separated roles which had originally overlapped. the surviving record preserves traces of that overlap.

to read / look into

allen ginsberg, howl and other poems
especially with the publication history in mind now: carr in the first dedication, carr asking to disappear from later ones, and the obscenity case that followed publication.

allen ginsberg, kaddish and other poems
i want to read this beside more of the history of naomi ginsberg and psychiatric institutionalization rather than treating the biographical material as something separate from the poem.

william s. burroughs, naked lunch
currently reading. i particularly want to keep the manuscript history beside the finished book, because knowing that ginsberg and kerouac were literally helping type and organize the material changes the way i imagine its creation.

william s. burroughs, queer
especially the later introduction on joan's death and the “ugly spirit.” i saw the film first and want to see what becomes different when the loneliness has burroughs's own sentences around it.

jack kerouac and william s. burroughs, and the hippos were boiled in their tanks
the carr-kammerer killing turned into fiction almost immediately, before either writer was famous and before the beat generation existed as a public category.

joyce johnson, the voice is all
partly because so many later accounts of the early circle depend on her reconstruction of it, including the more complicated picture of carr, kammerer, and ginsberg.

james campbell, this is the beat generation
for the early “libertine circle” before the story becomes the cleaner sequence of canonical books i already know.

paul bowles
more generally for now. i am still at the stage where tangier keeps opening another door and i would rather follow it before pretending i know which bowles book is going to matter most to me.

sources / rabbit hole

the last beat — columbia magazine
the most useful single piece i found for carr, kammerer, the murder, the legal aftermath, and ginsberg's place in the early circle.

kill your darlings — sony pictures classics
among other things, the production material is what finally solved my imaginary “ginsberg raided the library” memory.

interview with john krokidas and austin bunn — writers guild foundation
useful for what the filmmakers thought they were correcting in the carr / kammerer story.

allen ginsberg: beat poet, counterculture icon, psychiatric patient — columbia medicine
on ginsberg's eight months at the new york state psychiatric institute and the relationship between his psychiatric history and his writing.

allen ginsberg — poetry foundation
useful for the drug history, the poems ginsberg associated with particular drugs, and the later political chronology.

beat memories: the photographs of allen ginsberg — national gallery of art
ginsberg's photographs and his later captions are probably my favorite documents i found. they make the private history unusually literal; one of his photographs of burroughs is captioned with the fact that they were lovers in 1953.

naked lunch: the first fifty years — columbia university libraries
manuscripts, correspondence, and the paper trail showing ginsberg and kerouac helping burroughs assemble the book.

introduction to queer — william s. burroughs
the source for burroughs's own later account of joan's death, the “ugly spirit,” and why he connected the event to becoming a writer.

parts unknown: tangier — transcript
the bourdain episode which helped produce this entire secondary rabbit hole.

paul bowles collection — harry ransom center
biographical material and the tangier chronology.

recommendations

howl — allen ginsberg
probably the most obvious place to begin, but obvious for a reason. it is also where this entire rabbit hole began for me.

kill your darlings (2013)
not a documentary, and i would especially keep the carr / kammerer complications above in mind while watching it. still, i recommend it very much. daniel radcliffe's performance particularly impressed me, and some of the imagery is beautiful. my letterboxd review.

queer (2024)
beautiful, lonely, strange, and considerably less interested in making burroughs look cool than one might expect from a film about william burroughs. my letterboxd review.

william s. burroughs, naked lunch
i am currently in the process of reading this. it makes considerably more sense to me now that i know something about tangier, the addiction, and the friends who helped assemble the manuscript.

anthony bourdain, parts unknown: tangier
a very good route from burroughs into the larger mythology of tangier, and then beyond burroughs toward bowles. it is also responsible for at least one false memory i had to correct while writing this post.

paul bowles, the sheltering sky
the paul bowles book i have right now! this is the next direction my tangier rabbit hole is taking me.

tv on the radio, “wolf like me”
a song i like very much and recommend.

last edited: 20 september 2026

19 Sep 2026, 14:25

16 Sep 2026

marxism

things i like

“All that is solid melts into air.”
— karl marx and friedrich engels, the communist manifesto

“pictured reading karl marx beside his parents' pool / facing ridicule he pleaded / ‘that doesn't make me rich, no way / it's only outdoor and it isn't heated’”
— los campesinos!, renato dall'ara

marx is easier to read when he is treated as someone attempting an explanation of nineteenth-century capitalism rather than as the author of a ready-made answer to every subsequent political question. his work combines philosophy with economic analysis, and the vocabulary changes considerably between the early manuscripts and capital. the word marxism introduces still another difficulty, since it names a tradition whose participants frequently disagree about what marx meant.

in the economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844, marx describes alienated labor as a relationship between workers and the activity through which they reproduce their lives. the product of labor belongs to someone else, and the worker generally has little authority over the conditions under which it is made. this goes beyond the familiar observation that work can be exhausting or badly paid. a person may be well compensated and still have very little control over the activity to which most of the day is devoted.

marx's later account of capitalism becomes more technical. in capital, labor-power is treated as a commodity sold for a wage. the worker receives the value of that labor-power, while the work performed can produce more value than the wage represents. the difference is central to marx's account of surplus value and exploitation. this is a specific economic argument, not simply a synonym for employers behaving badly; it depends on assumptions about value that have been extensively debated.

commodity fetishism is another term that has acquired an unfortunate second life outside its original context. it does not mean enjoying shopping too much. marx is describing a social situation in which relationships between producers appear as relationships between commodities and their prices. the institutions governing production can begin to look like impersonal properties of things rather than arrangements maintained through human activity. in a market, the price appears on the label, while the conditions under which the object was made are usually elsewhere.

historical materialism develops from the proposition that people must produce the material conditions of their existence and that the organization of this production shapes political and intellectual life. marx and engels argued against explaining historical change exclusively through the evolution of ideas. the economic and social relations of a period matter to which ideas become influential and how institutions survive. this does not mean that a change in technology automatically produces one predetermined political outcome. there are much stronger deterministic versions of the theory, and they remain disputed.

the account of ideology is more complicated than the popular caricature in which everyone who disagrees with marx has simply been deceived. an institution can become so familiar that its historical origins are easy to overlook. the relevant question is how certain descriptions of social life become common sense, particularly when those descriptions help reproduce the arrangements they describe. later writers such as antonio gramsci developed this problem through the concept of hegemony, giving education and cultural institutions a more explicit role.

marxism also changed enormously after marx. gramsci's writing on political power differs substantially from g. a. cohen's analytical reconstruction of historical materialism. leszek kołakowski's history documents just how extensive these disagreements became, particularly over how historical explanation works and what can legitimately be inferred from marx's critique of capitalism.

it is possible to find parts of the analysis illuminating without treating every prediction as vindicated. marx expected capitalist development to produce certain patterns of class conflict, but capitalism has changed through political institutions and economic arrangements that his nineteenth-century texts could not fully anticipate. the interesting work begins when a theory is precise enough to be tested against that history. i have been trying to make my way through capital, which is a substantially bigger undertaking than recognizing the phrase about everything solid melting into air.

to read

karl marx, economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844
especially the writing on alienated labor. early marx, and probably the marx i am most immediately attracted to: productive activity as something that should belong meaningfully to human life rather than merely sustain it.

karl marx, capital, volume i
commodities, value, exploitation, accumulation, and the organization of capitalist production. i particularly want to understand commodity fetishism beyond the considerably less interesting internet meaning of “people really like buying things.” (eventually i will actually have to read the enormous book.)

antonio gramsci, selections from the prison notebooks
hegemony and the problem of how a social order maintains itself without depending entirely upon coercion. probably especially relevant to what interests me about the reproduction of institutions and common sense.

g. a. cohen, karl marx's theory of history: a defence
an unusually systematic reconstruction of historical materialism and one of the foundational texts of analytical marxism. i suspect the parts i disagree with will be at least as useful as the parts i don't.

leszek kołakowski, main currents of marxism
a very large intellectual history of marxism. particularly interested in this because it treats marxism as a tradition with a history rather than beginning from the assumption that the purpose of reading its history is to discover the correct marxism.

c. wright mills, the marxists
marxism approached by a sociologist already concerned with class and power. i am interested in the attempt to separate what remains intellectually useful in the tradition from what became doctrine. (also: mills!!!!)

last edited: 31 october 2026

16 Sep 2026, 21:17

royal academy's young artists' summer show 2026

Bonnie by Theo-Fox, age 7

Merlin by Astrid, age 8

Jeffery 2026 by Rupert, age 6

Wiggles in the Woods by Iona, age 11

Memories of Mandeville by Sophia, age 11

last edited: 16 september 2026

16 Sep 2026, 14:27

yuno gasai

when i was in middle school and watching endless amounts of anime, i stumbled across what became my favorite anime and, somehow, continues to be my favorite to this day: future diary. might be dangerous to rewatch it now. there were pieces of it that already fell short for me in middle school, specifically that it was very obviously tailored to a male audience and could be weirdly predatory about its female characters. there are sexualized shots of characters who are supposed to be fourteen, among other things that i remember bothering me even when i was around the same age as the characters myself. i am less innocent now and much more aware of why that kind of thing frustrates me, so there is a decent chance i would feel frustrated watching it.

still, what made future diary so good to me was that the characters were deeply interesting and the story was intricate in a way that completely consumed me. what was EXTREMELY frustrating was going on the internet after watching it and reading what other people thought about yuno. it seemed like everybody either hated her because she was “crazy,” or loved her for basically the same reason: ohhhh she's so crazy she's my yandere waifu!!!! i hate both of these interpretations. one person is frightened by the archetype and the other wants to put it on a body pillow. i think anyone who either a. hates yuno because she is crazy or b. loves her because she is their crazy waifu has managed to misunderstand one of the most important parts of the show.

also, i have never watched future diary: redial, the ova that continues the ending, nor do i particularly plan to. it seems lame from what i have seen of it and i think the ending of future diary is fine as it is. everything i am writing here takes into account the fact that i have not seen it. major spoilers obviously.....

the show opens with this strange little sequence that does not make much sense yet. yuno is desperately trying to wake an unresponsive yuki, there are pills beside him, and we see another confusing image involving a girl in a cage. then the show moves on and, for a majority of the series, doesn't explain what that was. we meet yuki, who spends most of his life observing people rather than interacting with them and compulsively records what happens around him in a diary on his phone. he also talks to deus ex machina, the god of time and space, although at this point yuki thinks deus is an imaginary friend he created in his head. yuno is this very popular girl in his class who has seemingly never paid much attention to him before. then suddenly she is paying a LOT of attention to him. she knows things about him she should not know. she knows where he is going to be. she follows him around. she seems completely obsessed with him.

then they find out about the game. deus is actually real, and there are twelve diary holders, all of whom already had some unusually specific way of recording their lives. their diaries now predict the future, and what they predict depends on what kind of diary that person kept in the first place. yuki's phone tells him what will happen around him. yuno's phone is entirely about yuki. one of the children has his future diary in the form of a coloring/picture diary. the diaries can also warn their owners when something is going to happen to them, including a “dead end” when the future currently predicts their death. deus tells them that they are in a survival game and basically have to kill one another until there is only one diary holder left, who will replace him as god.

(thought i had: does yuno's diary being about yuki imply that she already had a crush on him before the game? EDIT: could not remember, so i googled it. YES. before the game, yuki tells yuno that he wants to go stargazing with his family someday. yuno points out that he doesn't have a bride yet and asks if she can become his bride and go stargazing with him. yuki agrees without taking it particularly seriously, but yuno does. she starts keeping her diary about him because she already likes him.)

yuno immediately teams up with yuki. their diaries are actually extremely useful together because his tells him about everything around him while hers tells her about him. she is also immediately willing to do basically anything necessary to keep him alive. the weird part is still that nobody, including yuki, understands why she cares about him this much. a little crush and a promise to look at the stars together is one thing; whatever is happening with yuno is something else entirely, especially given that she had paid basically zero attention to him before that random day in class.

yuki, however, increasingly thinks yuno is crazy. from his perspective she is suddenly extremely attached to him, incredibly violent, and willing to kill basically anybody she needs to during the game. she is a character who is still easy to empathize with throughout a lot of this given they are in a game where everyone is trying to kill each other. there is also a point where she is captured by tsubaki's followers and threatened with being raped and killed, with the threat being used to lure yuki back. yuki reaches her before it happens, but watching yuno terrified and trapped while all of this is happening makes her desperation afterward easy to understand.

there are obviously moments where empathizing with her is harder. the one i had been remembering was the whole thing with yuki's mom. yuki is initially horrified about yuno meeting her, which is actually kind of funny because his mom ends up really liking yuno and approving of her as his girlfriend. later, when reisuke is staying with them, yuno tries to kill him with a hammer and accidentally hits yuki's mom instead, knocking her unconscious. looking back, i still don't think this is that bad given it was an accident. when i believed she had killed yuki's mom, i saw this as a potentially irredeemable part of her character which is later explained by her backstory. she doesn't actually kill her, though; yuki's father does later.

we eventually get yuno's backstory and learn that she was horribly abused by her parents. her parents would starve her and lock her in a cage. eventually yuno turned the cage back on them and locked them inside it, where they died. suddenly the fact that she is capable of being frighteningly controlling herself makes considerably more sense. she learned incredibly young that love and control and confinement could all exist in the same place. but this still doesn't explain why the little crush she had on yuki before the game has apparently become the single most important thing in her life. and then we find out yuno has already played the game before.

in the first world, yuno and yuki were both diary holders. they went through the entire game together, became lovers, and eventually ended up as the final two people standing. neither of them wanted to kill the other, so they decided that they would die together instead. they would take pills and go to sleep beside each other. yuki died. yuno didn't. she had only pretended to take the pills because she believed that if she became god, she could bring yuki back to life afterward. she could win the game, resurrect him, and finally they could just be together without anybody forcing one of them to kill the other. except becoming god did not let her do that. she could restore his body, but she could not restore his soul. yuki was actually gone.

so yuno went back in time. she entered another version of the world where another yuno and another yuki existed. she killed the yuno who belonged to that world, took her place, and started the game again. the yuno we have been watching for almost the entire show is not meeting yuki for the first time. he is meeting her for the first time. she has already known him. she has already fallen in love with him. they have already survived the game together. they have already planned to die together. she has already watched him die, become god because she thought she could bring him back, discovered that even becoming god could not give him back to her, and then literally torn open another timeline because she wanted to be with him again. yuki thinks that their relationship is beginning because he does not remember the first world. we think that it is beginning because we are following yuki. yuno is the only person in their relationship who knows that they have already had an entire life together.

honestly, even if i had remembered correctly and yuno really had killed yuki's mom, i think i might have still empathized with her after learning everything else. by this point, yuno's attitude toward the world seems to be that almost nothing matters beyond preserving as much time with yuki as possible. she has already learned that time can be turned backward and an entire world can be replaced by another one, so even something as permanent as killing someone does not necessarily seem permanent to her. if something goes horribly wrong, she can go back and make it so that it never happened.

this also explains why she seems so indifferent to the world around them. she has already learned that this is not the only version of reality. there was a first world. now there is a second. if the second one fails, she can do it again. another yuki exists. another yuno exists. another game can happen. from her perspective, everything around them has already demonstrated that it can be reset. even killing the second yuno makes sense within this. she isn't trying to create a life with some random boy she has decided belongs to her. she is trying to get back to the person she already lost. every time the world separates them, she finds another version of the world.

yuno says something along the lines of, “i'm crazy? what's crazy is this world that refuses to let me be with you.” everyone uses this as crazy yandere yuno evidence and i feel like i am going insane because she is literally describing the plot. the world actually will not let her be with him. the rules of the first game force one of them to die. she tries to beat that by becoming god. godhood cannot resurrect him. she tries to beat that by going backward in time. now she is living beside another version of the person she loved while being the only one who remembers what happened between them.

i don't think yuno is “crazy.” SORRY!!!!!!! i don't. i think she is behaving according to a reality that nobody else in the story understands until very late in the series. she knows that the world can restart. she knows that people can have duplicates. she knows that death can be escaped in one sense but horrifyingly not escaped in another. most importantly, she knows that she has already lost yuki once. she is just taking all of the time with him that she can get.

eventually the second world starts falling apart too, and yuno is prepared to do the same thing again. go backward. find another world. kill another yuno. find another yuki. start over. if the universe keeps producing versions of the person she loves, why would she accept the one reality in which she has to live without him? but at the end she finally doesn't. yuki is willing to let her kill him. he encourages her to do it so that she can survive, become god, and presumably find him again. this is the exact opportunity yuno has spent the entire series trying to preserve: another chance, another world, another yuki. instead, she kills herself.

i love the ending.. i think it is incredibly melancholic and incredibly sweet. yuno has spent more than one lifetime refusing to accept a universe in which she cannot be with yuki, and when she is finally given the choice to sacrifice him again for another chance, she chooses him instead of the chance. she lets herself be the one who disappears. yuki becomes god and goes back to a world without her. he spends 10,000 years there grieving her, and then, at the very end of the series, his future diary changes. where it had recorded yuno's death, it suddenly says that yuno has come to see him, and we hear her calling for him. that's it. redial apparently explains how she gets there, but i have never watched it and don't really want to. i like that the original ending doesn't explain it. after everything yuno has already done to get back to yuki, we just find out that somehow she did it again.

this might be my most annoying post yet. sorry if it's embarrassing. whatever. it's my website.

last edited: 16 september 2026

16 Sep 2026, 13:41

13 Sep 2026

internet........

last edited: 13 september 2026

13 Sep 2026, 19:37

12 Sep 2026

astrophysics

i spent about a month being kept behind when my class learned multiplication. the other children seemed to understand it almost immediately, which was particularly embarrassing because i had always found reading easy and assumed that most schoolwork would continue in the same manner. eventually i worked out what was going on and became fascinated with arithmetic. i don't remember the moment it started making sense. i remember wanting to keep doing it afterward, including when there was no homework to finish.

i was already spending a great deal of time looking at the sky. at my grandparents' house i used to sit on the balcony for hours, and once, when i was very young, i recorded approximately thirty minutes of myself talking about astronomy. i would love to know what i was explaining, since i cannot imagine that i had much information at my disposal. i wish i still had the video. i told people i wanted to become "a mathematician but for space," which was my best attempt at describing astrophysics before i knew the profession existed.

for a while i read almost exclusively about the big bang and white holes. the latter are hypothetical regions that appear in certain mathematical extensions of general relativity; unlike black holes, from which light cannot escape beyond the event horizon, nothing can enter a white-hole region. i was interested in how the time-reversed counterpart of a black-hole solution could exist on paper even though there was no evidence that such an object could actually form. i remember searching for articles about whether the big bang might have been a white hole, an idea that appears in some speculative cosmological proposals but is by no means an established description of the early universe. there are plenty of solutions to physical equations that nature has apparently declined to produce.

general relativity was also my introduction to the problem of trying to picture something that is easier to formulate mathematically. mass and energy affect the geometry of spacetime, and the motion of freely falling bodies follows that geometry. the curvature isn't something happening to an ordinary physical surface inside a larger room. i found diagrams of rubber sheets and bowling balls useful until i began asking what, exactly, the sheet was supposed to be bending into. those diagrams have serious limitations, although explaining the actual mathematics to a child would have produced a few more problems.

one result i became interested in later concerns negative heat capacity. a self-gravitating system in approximate virial equilibrium can heat up as it loses energy, because the loss is accompanied by gravitational contraction. you can't apply every intuition developed from an ordinary gas in a container to a large collection of objects bound by their own gravity. this is especially relevant to stellar systems, and it is a good example of why it helps to know which assumptions have gone into a familiar physical rule before deciding that the rule has been violated.

quantum mechanics was harder for me to accept descriptively. the double-slit experiment is routinely introduced with the claim that particles behave like waves, but this can become misleading if you begin imagining the electron as a tiny object deciding which behavior to exhibit. individual detections are localized; the distribution of many detections can produce an interference pattern, provided the experimental arrangement allows it. which-path information affects that pattern. i understood the results long before i could explain the experiment without falling back on some version of the little ball or the water wave, both of which are inadequate. even now i find that the informal explanations require more qualifications than the equations do.

i was sixteen when i attended a planetarium presentation on dark matter. the speaker described how galactic rotation curves, among other observations, indicate more gravitating matter than the visible stars and gas can account for. it was probably the first time i understood how much of astrophysics is concerned with inferring things that have not been directly identified. the measurements are not especially vague: orbital velocities and gravitational lensing can be measured, and theories have to account for them. the question is what produces those effects. i wrote about this separately in a post on dark matter.

i also started reading about the anthropic principle. the observation that any observers must inhabit a universe compatible with their existence is a selection effect, and an important one when comparing cosmological possibilities. it cannot, by itself, tell us what physical process determined the relevant conditions. i kept looking for discussions of the mechanism behind particular cosmological parameters and finding that the literature had not necessarily settled it. some of my questions were probably badly formulated. others still don't have agreed answers.

the actual coursework has involved far less cosmology than all this might suggest. i spend most of my time learning the mathematics needed to approach it, and there are afternoons when i get stuck on a derivation because a textbook has omitted a step that the author evidently regards as too elementary to mention. sometimes it really is elementary and i have simply forgotten it. on exams, knowing roughly what a problem is asking is of limited use if you can't reproduce the argument under time pressure. i'd rather this were not true, but it is.

i sometimes wish introductory courses would spend more time explaining why a particular mathematical method is appropriate instead of demonstrating how to carry it out once that choice has already been made. i can follow a solution and still have trouble identifying the same structure when the numbers or notation change. it makes studying slower. i am trying to improve at working through unfamiliar problems before consulting examples, which is useful and also an excellent way to discover how long an afternoon can be.

science communication interests me for related reasons. an explanation can be technically correct and still leave out the exact step on which somebody's understanding depends. i have done this myself when talking about a subject i know well enough to forget which parts initially confused me. i would like to get better at distinguishing a genuinely necessary simplification from an omission that makes the reader do work the explanation was supposed to do.

right now there is an alarming amount of linear algebra between me and the questions i originally wanted to study. i continue to read about them anyway, usually when i should be doing something else. i still look at the stars when i get the chance, though boston's streetlights are not especially cooperative.

last edited: 31 october 2026

12 Sep 2026, 18:18

you will never know why

i watched my suicide: director's cut recently and there was a line that immediately made me reminisce about a particular period of my life: "if you want to kill yourself, kill the part of yourself you don't like."

i don't think i would have known how to describe what i was doing at the time, but in retrospect that is more or less what happened. i was going through a bad breakup, although i barely remember that period as a breakup anymore. i don't think i particularly missed the person... i moreso missed myself, given that i realized how little of myself i recognized and liked by the end of it.

i had been trying to get better before i met them. i was already attempting to pull myself out of a depression, and the relationship made me insecure enough that i lost some of that progress. when it ended, the task in front of me wasn't really getting over another person. it was figuring out how to unhate myself again. unfortunately this required spending an enormous amount of time with the person i hated... ME!!!!

i started remaking myself, although not in any particularly organized fashion. for a while i stopped sleeping in my bedroom because it felt haunted. not literally. it had simply accumulated too much evidence of me being miserable. i associated the room with lying in bed depressed so completely that eventually entering it seemed to reproduce the feeling. i slept on the couch and sometimes in my mom's bed instead. i stayed awake for most of the night because i couldn't sleep. at some point my mom remarked that i wasn't crying as much anymore. she didn't know about the breakup because i had never actually told her. apparently the improvement was visible before i really understood that it was happening.

one night i was lying on the couch listening to an enormous spotify playlist made by a stranger online named maxwell kass. i vaguely knew who he was, but only in the strange peripheral way you can know somebody online: enough that his name meant something to me, not enough that there was any sensible reason for him to become important to my life. he had playlists that were hundreds of hours long, and i would put them on shuffle without knowing what i was going to hear.

somewhere inside more than 300 hours of somebody else's music, "air supply" by sweet trip came on. there was no deliberate act of discovery; i wasn't searching for an album that would explain my life to me. i wasn't even searching for sweet trip. the song had been sitting somewhere inside a stranger's enormous playlist until shuffle produced the correct accident.

then i listened to you will never know why, and it became inseparable from the rest of that period.

"air supply" still feels like the center of it for me. there is something about the longing in it that feels sincere without becoming theatrical. its desire for closeness is accompanied by the knowledge that closeness is unstable, and that tension appears throughout the album. sweetness never seems entirely secure. affection and uncertainty are allowed to occupy the same place; intimacy does not abolish distance. somehow there is an almost impossible brightness running through all of it anyway.

i think i needed that brightness. pain has an irritating ability to make itself seem profound merely because it hurts. misery repeats itself and still demands to be treated as revelation. happiness is stranger. happiness requires the world to become interesting again. there were nights then when nothing in my life had been solved and i nevertheless wanted to hear another song, drive another mile, wait another hour for the sun to come up. wanting anything from the next hour felt new. the album did not make me feel cured or wise or even particularly stable. it made me want things again. MORE SONG MORE ROAD MORE MORNING!!!! >_<

because i was awake most of the night anyway, i started going on drives. sometimes i would drive nearly to the airport without taking the highway, following surface streets for an unnecessarily long time while almost everyone else was asleep. i didn't particularly want to arrive anywhere. i wanted the drive to continue. eventually the black outside the windows would become blue and then morning would begin without asking whether i was finished with the night. my mom was an early bird, so if i stayed awake long enough i could meet her there. my night and her morning overlapped for a little while and we could hang out. i loved those hours. i wanted to stay inside them for as long as possible.

i found a lot of japanese breakfast around then too ("the woman that loves you!”), which i would also come to associate with that period of my life. music sometimes stops functioning as a record of a period and becomes one of the materials from which the period is made. i can't separate those songs from empty roads around my hometown, the couch at four in the morning, my mom waking up, or staying awake long enough to watch the sunrise. remove the music and the memory is not merely quieter; it is a different memory.

eventually i decided the bedroom itself had to go. there was a storage room in the house, so i switched them. i moved everything being stored there into my old bedroom and turned the storage room into mine. the new room was better… it had built-in shelves, which i loved, but the most significant matter was that it had no history. nothing had happened to me there yet. i believe that there is an enormous luxury in a room that has never seen you cry.

the physical rearrangement became part of a larger one. i started wearing my hair differently. i changed how i dressed. i spent more time with my friends. even my personality seemed to change. people around me noticed that i was doing better. after a while i felt almost like an entirely different person, which is perhaps an alarming thing to say about recovery but was nevertheless true.

i don't think self-destruction and self-reinvention are necessarily the same thing, which is why i like the line from my suicide but don't take it literally. there are parts of ourselves that need patience rather than elimination, and there are parts we condemn simply because they are in pain. still, there are arrangements of a life that eventually become unlivable. sometimes something unbearable happens and afterward, among the wreckage, you discover that you have finally been given permission to change things you should have changed long ago. apparently, for me, this involved changing everything down to which room in the house i slept in.

you will never know why always brings me back to that version of my hometown. the memory is bittersweet because i know intellectually that i was doing badly, but the images i retained are beautiful: empty roads, sunrises, my mom being awake when i came home, my friends noticing i was happier before i fully noticed it myself, built-in shelves, finding a song by accident in the middle of a stranger's impossibly long playlist. this is the annoying thing about memory. suffering does not preserve itself exclusively as suffering. sometimes a terrible period of your life contains a beautiful morning and you are stuck loving the morning forever.

music preserves a self that no longer exists with an accuracy that ordinary remembering sometimes cannot manage. i am not the person who first heard "air supply" on that couch anymore, but the first few seconds can still return the dimensions of her world to me. i remember what mattered to her, what the roads looked like, the peculiar loneliness of being awake while almost everybody else was asleep, and the enormous tenderness i felt toward anything that made me want to remain awake a little longer. for a few minutes i can almost remember what it was like not to know what happened next.

you will never know why became part of my soul because it attached itself to a period when i was learning to desire my own life again. not life in the abstract. i mean stupid, particular life: another song i hadn't heard, another road i hadn't finished driving, my mom waking up, a room with built-in shelves, my friends, morning, whatever came next. i had spent so long wanting to escape myself that wanting more of my own life felt almost obscene. MORE PLEASE!!!! i wanted to see what else could happen to me.

i haven't been doing so hot recently. maybe seeing my suicide and remembering that line made me return to all of this because i needed the memory for reasons other than nostalgia. i don't want to reproduce that period; i don't even want to become that person again. i want what she wanted. another song, another morning, another version of the room. i want to recover the appetite she developed for finding out what happened next without having to destroy my life first. (god please let me learn one thing the easy way maybe.......)

all we can do is try our best.

it's kind of a funny story by ned vizzini helped me think about this too, but honestly it needs its own post at some point.

not today.

that's all.

listen: you will never know why — sweet trip

12 Sep 2026, 18:17

11 Sep 2026

pluto

psychoceramics got me thinking about percival lowell, who is probably one of my favorite examples of the uncomfortable boundary between being wrong and being worth taking seriously.

lowell became famous, or infamous, for his observations of mars. giovanni schiaparelli had described canali on the martian surface, and lowell became convinced that these were artificial canals constructed by intelligent martians attempting to move water across a dying planet. he spent years observing and drawing them at the observatory he founded in flagstaff. he also wrote about mars obsessively. first there was mars, then mars and its canals, and eventually mars as the abode of life. you can almost see the theory becoming more elaborate in the titles alone. by the early twentieth century many astronomers were already skeptical of the canals, which they could not reliably observe, but lowell kept going.

this understandably did not help his reputation. there is something very psychoceramic about producing a myriad of increasingly elaborate details from an observation whose existence is itself in dispute. but i think the more interesting thing about lowell is that being spectacularly wrong about one thing did not make him incapable of being interesting about another.

lowell became convinced that another planet existed beyond neptune. he called it planet x and spent years searching for it from lowell observatory. the best part of the entire story is that he actually photographed pluto and didn't notice it. pluto was sitting there as a tiny point of light on photographs produced during his search, but it was much fainter than the planet he thought he was looking for. lowell died without knowing that the thing he had spent so long trying to find had already passed through his photographs.

the search was eventually resumed. lowell observatory hired clyde tombaugh, a 23-year-old farm boy from kansas who had never gone to college and had built his own telescopes. he had mailed the observatory drawings he made of jupiter and mars, and they were apparently good enough to get him a trial job. the offer was wonderfully vague about what he would actually be doing. photography, apparently. janitorial work, possibly. he was very much an assistant rather than some established astronomer arriving to solve the mystery. within a year they gave him the search that had defeated everyone before him.

tombaugh's method was wonderfully tedious. he photographed the same part of the sky on different nights and put the plates into a blink comparator, switching rapidly between them. the stars stayed in place. something closer would appear to jump. he did this over and over and over again until he found a tiny moving point.

it was pluto.

and then an eleven-year-old girl named it.

venetia burney, an english schoolgirl, suggested pluto, after the roman god of the underworld. the suggestion eventually made its way to flagstaff and the observatory chose it. there was also a particularly satisfying accident in the name: PL were percival lowell's initials. even the astronomical symbol for pluto incorporated a P and an L.

also, because i had to know which pluto came first: the planet did. the dog who would become pluto appeared as a bloodhound later in 1930, but he wasn't actually mickey's dog named pluto until 1931. disney says the name was most likely inspired by the newly discovered planet. so pluto the dog is apparently named after pluto the planet, which was named by an eleven-year-old girl, partly selected because its first two letters happened to be the initials of a dead astronomer who had already photographed it without realizing it. good.

pluto would probably be my favorite planet if it were still allowed to be one, if only because the history is so fun. i also just like lowell observatory. there is something charming about the whole chain of events taking place there: lowell building an observatory partly because he was obsessed with martian canals, looking for a planet he never got to see discovered, photographing it anyway, and then a young assistant arriving years after his death and finding the tiny thing by watching dots jump back and forth.

of course, pluto is no longer technically a planet. the definition adopted in 2006 requires a planet not only to orbit the sun and be massive enough for gravity to make it nearly round, but also to have cleared the neighborhood around its orbit. pluto fails the last part, so it is a dwarf planet.

neil degrasse tyson was actually on this surprisingly early. when the rose center for earth and space opened in 2000, the exhibits didn't put pluto with the terrestrial planets or the gas giants. it was displayed with the icy objects of the outer solar system instead. tyson headed the science committee behind the exhibits and consequently spent years being yelled at by people who thought he had personally killed pluto, well before the official decision in 2006.

i think what i like most about the discovery is that nobody in it quite gets the story they were expecting. lowell's calculations did not really predict pluto in the triumphant way the story is sometimes told. the supposed irregularities that motivated the search for planet x largely disappeared once neptune's mass was measured more accurately. pluto happened to be there anyway. lowell looked for the wrong planet for reasons that turned out to be wrong and helped create the conditions under which the right object was found.

there is probably something worth keeping in that. being wrong does not make every observation useless, and being right at the end does not retroactively make every premise correct. sometimes somebody spends years looking in roughly the right direction for the wrong reason, photographs the answer without recognizing it, dies, and leaves the rest of the problem to a farm boy and an eleven-year-old girl.

last edited: 11 september 2026

11 Sep 2026, 13:10

psychoceramics

the study of crackpots, cranks, eccentrics, unsolicited theorists, and the elaborate intellectual systems they leave behind. psychoceramics is not a particularly serious name, and at present not much of a serious discipline either. most encounters with it amount to recreational interest in people who have developed theories of physics in which einstein made a fatal algebraic error, discovered the true location of atlantis, decoded the secret chronology of the bible, or otherwise noticed something that has somehow escaped everyone whose profession requires noticing it.

there is nevertheless a serious subject hiding inside the joke.

the interesting crank is not simply ignorant. ignorance requires very little explanation. more peculiar is the person who has worked extraordinarily hard at being wrong. crank literature can represent years or decades of reading, calculation, correspondence, annotation, and revision. its authors frequently possess enormous stores of factual knowledge about their chosen subjects. they develop specialized vocabularies and classifications, build historical narratives, produce diagrams and mathematical demonstrations, and anticipate objections. in this sense the crank has more in common with the scholar than with the merely uninformed person: both have made a discipline of thinking about something.

the obvious difference is that one discipline has acquired mechanisms for preventing thought from becoming entirely answerable to itself.

this makes psychoceramics an interesting problem for the sociology of knowledge. science and scholarship do not produce reliable knowledge merely because intelligent people participate in them. intelligent people are perfectly capable of producing nonsense, and in fact can produce considerably more sophisticated nonsense than everyone else. intellectual disciplines instead surround individual thought with methods for testing it and other people capable of challenging it. claims have to survive criticism. evidence has to remain evidence when inspected by somebody who does not already accept the conclusion. methods can be reproduced. predictions can fail. an explanation must retain some conceivable relationship to the possibility that it is wrong.

the crank often preserves the recognizable motions of this process while quietly eliminating the possibility of failure. objections are incorporated into the theory. missing evidence acquires an explanation. hostile experts become evidence of institutional resistance; indifference becomes evidence that nobody has looked closely enough. eventually the theory develops the peculiar advantage of being able to explain both the existence and absence of evidence for itself. what appears to be an increasingly comprehensive theory is actually an increasingly closed one.

particularly strange is the density of detail in psychoceramic writing. crank theories tend not merely to contain conclusions but enormous architectures of supporting facts. some details are taken from legitimate sources and rearranged into relationships their sources never proposed. others seem to emerge from the explanatory system itself. one invented connection requires another; the second makes a third necessary; eventually the theory contains a world's worth of particulars whose abundance begins to resemble evidence.

there is something philosophically uncomfortable here because this process is not completely alien to respectable thought. imagination is required to produce explanations before they can be tested. pattern recognition allows relationships to become visible before their significance is known. analogy, inference, abstraction, suspicion, and synthesis are indispensable intellectual activities. the mind has to exceed what is immediately given to it in order to understand anything at all. the same capacity that allows a person to discover a pattern also permits him to manufacture one.

there is an equally uncomfortable relationship between this and the archive. accumulation has an appearance of authority. a sufficiently large collection of fragments begins to suggest that the fragments belong together, even when their only real relationship is that somebody decided to keep them. an archive can preserve relationships that existed, but it can also produce new ones simply through proximity. two things placed beside one another invite comparison. ten things begin to look like a pattern.

this website obviously participates in that impulse. miscellanea is deliberately an accumulation: thoughts, quotations, images, conversations, things read and things worth keeping. there is no claim that the collection forms a system, which is probably important. still, collecting anything produces a little cosmology. selection gives unrelated things a common property: they passed through the attention of the same person and survived it.

perhaps this is part of what makes psychoceramic collections so compelling. the problem is not merely that the crank has gathered bad evidence. gathering itself can become a method of persuasion. once enough material has been preserved, classified, cross-referenced, and placed beside other material, the collection begins to imply that there must have been a reason for collecting it. quantity quietly becomes coherence.

the question of where all these details come from is consequently more interesting than determining whether each detail is true. psychoceramics sits somewhere near the boundary between discovery and invention. a novelist constructs a world and knows that he is constructing it. the crank appears capable of performing a remarkably similar cognitive operation while experiencing each new construction as something discovered about the world. the distinction between the two cannot simply be imagination, because both require quite a lot of it.

individual cranks may not even be the most informative cases. between established scholarship and the person mailing a hundred-page proof to a physics department exists an enormous intermediate territory of pseudosciences and other communities organized around their own standards of evidence. these complicate the reassuring idea that error is corrected simply by exposing a person to other people. communities can stabilize false beliefs as easily as they can destabilize them. peer criticism is useful only insofar as the peers share some mechanism by which criticism is allowed to matter.

the internet makes this intermediate territory unusually easy to produce. eccentricity no longer has to remain private long enough to die with its author. an obscure belief can locate an audience and eventually a community. enough private cosmologies brought into contact with one another can begin to resemble a school of thought. the relevant question becomes not only what causes people to develop strange systems of belief, but what social conditions allow particular systems to reproduce themselves.

this is where psychoceramics becomes less amusing. strange ideas are not historically confined to strange people. sufficiently successful fantasies can migrate out of the intellectual fringe and become ordinary explanations of the world. the history of ideas contains plenty of beliefs that were ridiculous without being inconsequential. studying the production of nonsense therefore also means studying the circumstances under which nonsense acquires authority.

perhaps the value of psychoceramics is ultimately diagnostic. a broken system makes visible the structures that ordinarily disappear when everything is working. looking at a discipline that has lost its mechanisms for verification and meaningful criticism clarifies what those mechanisms were doing in the first place. the crackpot is interesting not merely as an example of failed reasoning, but as a demonstration that reasoning alone is insufficient to guarantee reason.

last edited: 11 september 2026, 1:14 am edt

11 Sep 2026, 01:14

09 Sep 2026

1011

I SPARE MY FRIENDS THE REPEATED
DETAILS OF A SORE SUBJECT
THAT CIRCLES BACK.

circular numbered diagram

WHEN I’M ALONE, I BRING YOU UP
ALL THE TIME.

last edited: 9 september 2026

09 Sep 2026, 00:05

03 Sep 2026

Desiderium in the Black Triptychs

Francis Bacon's Black Triptychs

In Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, love and madness intertwine through homosexual themes and the artistic depiction of a muse decaying once his soul dissipates. In a real-life rendition of the classic story, Francis Bacon was a homosexual Irish-British triptych painter in the 1960s and 1970s who primarily painted his lover and muse, George Dyer. The Black Triptychs by Francis Bacon offer an in-depth examination of the human condition through love, grief, and solitude where, similar to Dorian Gray, the demise of George Dyer’s physical being and soul was rendered on canvas: a classical tragedy. An individual can examine emotion in art by intertwining visual rhetoric and psychology. Thus, art can delve into the mind and invoke emotion, transcending language and communicating directly with the subconscious through the interplay of colors, shapes, and symbols. By analyzing historical context, visual elements (lines, structure, colors, and lighting), societal and ethical values through repression and grief, and psychoanalytical theories from Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Jean Baudrillard, the Black Triptychs’ intervention with emotion can be deciphered.

In Francis Bacon: Anatomy of an Enigma by Michael Peppiat, Bacon revealed that he met the charismatic Dyer in a New York pub, where he recounts, “George was down the far end of the bar, and he came over and said ‘You all seem to be having a good time, can I buy you a drink?’” (Peppiat 259). After meeting George Dyer in the mid-60s, Francis Bacon painted a series of portraits of Dyer, gathering Bacon both fame and notoriety from both the conscious and homophobic figures in 1960s society. Nearly a decade into Francis Bacon and George Dyer’s relationship, Francis Bacon was to have his art grandly unveiled at the Grand Palais des Champs-Élysées in Paris. On October 24th, 1971, two days prior to the grand unveiling, George Dyer took his own life in the bathroom of the Parisian hotel room just across from Bacon’s room, where Francis Bacon was one of the first to discover his lifeless body. In David Sylvester’s 1987 interview, The Brutality of Fact: Interviews With Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon revealed that George Dyer was seemingly normal, cheerful even, just a few hours before his passing—he was shaking the hands of wealthy critics and charming them with his wit (Sylvester 168). However, according to Bacon, Dyer had attempted suicide on numerous occasions before the night of October 24th, when Bacon would have to resuscitate Dyer with a stomach pump. Despite Dyer’s charming façade in the hours before his death, George Dyer left the exhibition party early and quietly. When considering his most profound regret, Bacon admits, “If I’d have stayed with him rather than going to see about the exhibition, he would be here now. But I didn’t, and he’s dead” (Peppiat 265). In the years following, Francis Bacon went on to paint a series of triptychs depicting the suicide of George Dyer that went on to be known as the Black Triptychs.

In Francis Bacon’s 1973 depiction of the Black Triptychs, visual elements such as color, background, foreground, and overall structure can be analyzed to convey the story of Dyer’s death, more precisely, the moments before, during, and after his death. When examining the lines and overall structure of the artwork, it is notable that Bacon chooses to present the scene as a triptych rather than a singular image. Three is a prominent number in imagery and general life; in photography, there is a “rule of thirds,” and physicist Nikola Tesla even refers to the number three as the “key to the universe.” Through threes, a natural balance exists; two other visual elements center a single focal point. Bacon balances the three images through the lines of the doors, where the center image has a door with parallel lines, but the left and right doors have opposite diagonal lines that frame the center image. Additionally, life and death are balanced through Francis Bacon’s triptych paintings, where he positions the moment after Dyer’s death in the left panel, the moment before his death in the center panel, and the moment during his death in the right panel. Literally and symbolically, in the moment before Dyer’s suicide, he is in between life and death. The position between life and death signifies Dyer’s contemplation of whether to continue on or take his own life. Besides Dyer’s moral dilemmas, the position between life and death further represents his physical and emotional state at that time; while he was physically alive and well, his spirit was not—he was in between existence and ruin.

The triptych's color palette primarily contains red, beige, white, and black, with black being the most prominent in the center image. Chiaroscuro, or “light-dark,” is evident through contrasting blacks and whites. In the center photo, where Dyer is contemplating suicide, black seeps into the photo. Black can be linked with death and loss of innocence, while white can be linked with life, purity, and innocence. Dyer, a white figure, is being engulfed by the darkness—symbolically, the thoughts of suicide are overtaking Dyer and erasing his purity and will to live. In the left and right panels, white arrows point directly to Dyer’s body, while no arrow is in the center panel. There is a grey alarm behind George Dyer in the center of the photo, nearly hidden by the black background. The contrasting white arrows draw attention to the image, encouraging the audience to look at Dyer in his final moments. George Dyer’s struggles with mental health often went unnoticed, even by Francis Bacon, who watched him crack jokes and seem entirely unbothered just hours before his suicide. The alarm behind Dyer in the center photo serves as an alert or cry for help but is disregarded through its subtle coloring, being a few shades lighter than the black background. Hypophora refers to a person proposing a question and following it up with a clear answer. The lack of an arrow in the center image might represent how Dyer’s struggles were invisible while he was alive, while the arrows in the frames where Dyer is dying almost silently say, “Look here. Can you see how I feel now?” and there the answer is: Dyer’s emotional decay in its strongest manifestation.

Furthermore, the Black Triptychs present societal and ethical values through repression and grief. In the 1960s and 1970s, homophobia was widespread in society, causing members of the LGBTQ+ community to often repress or avoid their emotions. Still, Francis Bacon was an openly gay man, and despite being incredibly influential—even having a retrospective at the Grand Palais—museums often denied his work (Sylvester 160). Although Bacon himself was ostracized in 70s society, he fought LGBTQ+ erasure by painting his male lover and presenting the works at monumental events. Themes of repression are further elucidated in Bacon’s art through illustrations of George Dyer repressing his mental health struggles. While seemingly alive and well in the center image, Dyer is immersed in darkness and framed by his moribund body in the left and right images. Bacon incorporates pathos through themes of grief and solitude; Dyer is entirely alone, and even the arrows (which can draw attention to an object and create distance from an object) in the image further separate him from reality. The arrows in the left and right images make it evident that Dyer is suffering by drawing the eye directly to him. Bacon is coping with the shame of his loss through the images, questioning how George Dyer’s struggles with mental health were so invisible—how was he completely alone and unnoticed in his final moments?

Finally, the emotion behind the Black Triptychs can be interpreted through psychoanalytical analysis. In Literary Criticism: An Introduction to Theory and Practice by Charles Bressler, Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical theories discuss the Anal Stage in the Pre-Oedipal Development Phase, where a child first learns to potty train. Through potty training, a child first grasps whether or not it is okay to make mistakes based on a parent’s reaction to their failures, where themes of control and shame are prominent in this era of the child’s life (Bressler 151). In the Black Triptychs, George Dyer sits on a toilet during his death; his suicide is a moment of shame and control. George Dyer ends his life where he starts it: in the Anal Stage. The Genital Stage is prominent in Francis Bacon’s triptychs as well, since the stage symbolizes independence. Through self-pleasure, a child discovers they can live by their own means. In George Dyer’s attempt to independently gain control over his life, he takes it. Thanatos is the notion that a person has an innate and fundamental relationship with death; death can be treated as a haven at times through depictions of the afterlife or religion. A Psychodynamic Theory: Freud’s Psychoanalytical Theory of Personality by Daniel Cervone and Lawrence A. Pervin states, “...it reflects Freud's idea that a basic tendency of the organism is to seek a state of calmness. It also is consistent with observations of the human condition” (Cervone and Pervin 70). In George Dyer’s circumstances, Thanatos was his tranquility or rebirth. Dyer’s antanagoge, or silver lining in his death, was that his death was the moment he was most alive: he was reborn. Dyer resorted to death because he craved a better life and then ended back where he started: as a child in the Pre-Oedipal Development Phase.

On the other hand, Jacques Lacan and Jean Baudrillard tune in on reality through Lacan’s notion of “the Real” and Baudrillard’s notion of Simulacra. The Real is a dimension beyond words and control. Through the lack of words in Francis Bacon’s triptychs, he portrays that the situation is beyond words. Putting words onto paper often makes the reality of a situation seem more intense or alive. By avoiding language, Bacon can cope with his emotions and avoid reality alone with no verbal explanation. If Dyer’s death is blatantly written out, it is set in stone—Bacon can no longer avoid the situation when it is entirely real. Words do not assist the situation or do justice to Bacon’s grief. Moreover, Francis Bacon previously stated that he felt shame and regret for not being with George Dyer in his final moments. While accurately documenting George Dyer’s corpse, Francis Bacon was not there during Dyer’s death to canonically depict the left and right images in the triptych. However much Bacon tries to represent the Real (that is, his reality of the situation), he will always remain castrated from that reality. Ergo, the Real is not tangible beyond the frustrating notion that the Real is solely possible in a fantasy or, in Bacon’s situation, an artistic rendition. This phenomenon is what Lacan describes as the trauma of the Real. According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, what drives and conquers individuals is jouissance—the unachievable perception of satisfaction in attempting to transcend the Real and its constraints—Bacon copes by depicting his most authentic version of the Real in the Black Triptychs.

Moving forward with Bacon’s relationship with reality, in Jean Baudrillard’s psychoanalytical theories, the Simulacra can be defined as an artificial reproduction that becomes more real than the “real.” Virtual models disintegrate the distinctions between model and reality. Circling back to Bacon’s regret of not being present during Dyer’s final moments, Francis Bacon paints what he imagines Dyer’s last moments were. Francis Bacon has created a Simulacra to cope; in this version of reality, Francis Bacon can be right next to Dyer in his final hours. Through Simulacra, Bacon creates what Baudrillard describes as the hyperreal: a depiction of reality that is more real than reality itself. Through Bacon’s artistic framework, his version of reality is more accurate than the events that actually took place. Bacon incorporates images such as black shadows and solitude, paralleling Dyer’s emotions as he dies. Dyer’s emotions would not have a physical manifestation in a realistic image. Thus, Francis Bacon uses both Jacques Lacan's and Jean Baudrillard’s depictions of reality to cope with the passing of his lover and muse; through the Black Triptychs, life imitates art.

Overall, Francis Bacon's Black Triptychs provide a comprehensive analysis of the human condition through the intervention of love and tragedy. Through the play of ekphrasis, the means to psychologically describe visual art, art can be emotionally broken down. By examining the historical background, visual components, societal and ethical values, and psychoanalytical theories, the Black Triptychs’ emotional intervention, or “ekphrasis,” can be understood. Visual manifestations are often more accurate than a “true” depiction of an event. A person might question why Bacon would choose to relive the trauma of his lover’s suicide through the triptychs painted over several years. To that, Bacon would justify that his depiction of reality is more real than the actual events that took place, and through artistic depiction, Bacon can sit right in that bathroom beside Dyer. Throughout Dyer’s life, he was Bacon’s lover and muse and continued to be Bacon’s muse following his death—his suicide was a final pose for Francis Bacon’s portraits. Thus, the Black Triptychs clarify comprehension of what certain art forms can do by “seeing” the world in both artistic and psychological languages to convey themes of grief, love, and solitude.

last edited: 3 september 2026

03 Sep 2026, 16:39

Education and Resistance in Plato's Republic

while reading the “Allegory of the Cave” in Book VII of Plato’s Republic, i found myself wondering whether Socrates’ account of education is actually realistic. enlightenment in the allegory is an intensely painful and reluctant process. the freed prisoner does not willingly pursue truth. he has to be forced to turn around, dragged out of the cave, and compelled to confront a reality that initially causes him confusion and distress. even after becoming accustomed to the outside world, he cannot simply return and persuade the remaining prisoners of what he has seen. Socrates suggests that they would ridicule him and might even kill anyone who attempted to free them.

this seems to present a problem. if accepting reality is as difficult as the allegory suggests, why does Socrates nevertheless remain so confident in the necessity of philosophical education?

education as a reorientation of the soul

the prisoner’s problem is not merely that he lacks information. he has mistaken appearance for reality and built his entire understanding of the world upon that mistake. when he is first forced to look at the objects responsible for the shadows, he continues to believe that the shadows are “more real” than the objects before him. when he is dragged upward, he is “pained and dazzled” by the light and initially wants to return to what is familiar.

this is important because it means education cannot simply be the transfer of information from a knowledgeable person to an ignorant one. if that were the problem, somebody could merely tell the prisoner that the shadows were false. instead, his entire interpretation of reality has to change.

Socrates makes this explicit after the allegory when he rejects the idea that education consists of “putting knowledge into souls that lack it.” education is instead a turning of the soul toward what is real. the capacity for understanding is already there; the difficulty is getting it pointed in the right direction.

the gradual ascent from the cave reflects this. the prisoner cannot immediately look at the sun. he first looks at shadows, then reflections, then physical objects, and eventually the heavenly bodies and the sun itself. the soul needs time to adjust to reality. the discomfort of enlightenment is therefore not evidence that education has failed. it is part of what education is.

i think this is one of the most interesting implications of the allegory. Plato challenges the assumption that truth is necessarily welcomed when it is discovered. the prisoner rejects reality precisely because it conflicts with everything he previously understood. if genuine education requires a reorientation of the soul rather than the accumulation of facts, resistance should not be surprising. in some cases, resistance may even be evidence that a person's worldview is actually being challenged.

why people resist enlightenment

the prisoners who remain in the cave are not simply uninformed. they regard the shadows as “the truth.” familiarity has given those appearances a kind of authority. because the prisoners have spent their entire lives observing shadows, they have no reason to doubt the reality they already know.

this also explains their reaction when the liberated prisoner returns. because his eyes have not yet readjusted to the darkness, he appears impaired. rather than interpreting this as a consequence of having seen something beyond the cave, the prisoners interpret it according to the assumptions they already possess: leaving the cave damaged him. new evidence is incorporated into their existing worldview rather than being allowed to overturn it.

fear also seems important. the cave may be an illusion, but it is a stable and predictable illusion. the outside world promises greater truth, but reaching it requires abandoning the certainty the prisoners have always possessed. remaining where they are is easier and initially less painful.

there is also something personal about admitting that your understanding of reality has been wrong. beliefs are rarely isolated propositions. people build identities, habits, relationships, and communities around them. accepting the liberated prisoner’s account would require the cave dwellers to admit that something they had treated as obvious for their entire lives was false.

the fact that the shadows constitute a shared reality makes this even harder. every prisoner participates in the same system of interpretation. leaving the cave therefore means separating yourself not only from an idea but from a community organized around that idea. ridicule becomes a way of protecting the shared worldview from somebody who threatens it.

eventually this resistance becomes violent. Socrates says that the prisoners would kill someone who attempted to release them, an obvious echo of Socrates’ own execution. the allegory therefore becomes not only an account of education but an account of the danger faced by people who challenge established ways of understanding the world.

the political necessity of philosophical education

this initially makes Plato’s account of education seem almost pessimistic. every stage of the ascent involves pain or resistance, and those who remain behind may actively reject the person who has escaped. but the political argument that follows the allegory does not actually depend on everyone becoming a philosopher.

instead, the highest form of philosophical education is reserved for the people who will eventually govern the city. Socrates insists that those who have escaped the cave cannot remain outside contemplating reality forever. they must “go down again among the prisoners” and participate in political life. although the philosopher would naturally prefer contemplation, the city that made his education possible has a claim on what that education produced.

this changes the purpose of philosophical education. it is not merely a private achievement and it is not an attempt to transform every citizen into a philosopher. its political purpose is to produce rulers capable of distinguishing reality from appearance and governing according to knowledge of the Good rather than opinion.

the philosopher therefore returns to the cave not because enlightenment is guaranteed to spread successfully, but because knowledge creates a political responsibility. Socrates can acknowledge that most people are deeply attached to appearances without abandoning philosophical education, because the just city does not require universal philosophical enlightenment. it requires that the people responsible for governing it have undergone that education.

this is what ultimately resolves the problem i initially had with the allegory. Plato does not underestimate how difficult it is to change someone’s understanding of reality. the pain, confusion, attachment, and hostility are central to his account. philosophical education remains necessary not despite this resistance but partly because of it. if human beings are so easily attached to appearances, political life requires rulers who have been trained to distinguish appearance from reality.

the cave is therefore not simply a story about discovering the truth. it is also a story about why truth can be so difficult to accept, why people defend familiar illusions even when confronted with alternatives, and why Plato nevertheless thinks the painful process of turning the soul toward reality is indispensable to a just political life.

adapted from a paper on Book VII of Plato’s Republic.

last edited: 3 september 2026, 4:27 pm edt

03 Sep 2026, 16:27

01 Sep 2026

bataille excerpt

story of the eye — georges bataille

“to others, the universe seems decent because decent people have gelded eyes. that is why they fear lewdness. they are never frightened by the crowing of a rooster or when strolling under a starry heaven. in general, people savor the ‘pleasures of the flesh’ only on condition that they be insipid.

but as of then, no doubt existed for me: i did not care for what is known as ‘pleasures of the flesh’ because they really are insipid; i cared only for what is classified as ‘dirty.’ on the other hand, i was not even satisfied with the usual debauchery, because the only thing it dirties is debauchery itself, while, in some way or other, anything sublime and perfectly pure is left intact by it. my kind of debauchery soils not only my body and my thoughts, but also anything i may conceive in its course, that is to say, the vast starry universe, which merely serves as a backdrop.”

he’s so right. everyone is so obnoxious about sex (and vices in general). i have always been relatively indifferent to these moral panics around sex, not because sex is necessarily meaningless, but because i don’t think its meaning is fixed in advance. sex can definitely have meaning and serve as an act of love in the way that it’s intimate and you give pleasure while you get it. in the same way, i think it can mean nothing, or it can be beautiful and degrading at once.

what i especially like here is his idea that ordinary debauchery is still strangely well-behaved. it is allowed to be “dirty,” but only inside the little category we have already designated as dirty. everything outside of it — scholarship, professionalism, seriousness, purity, the sublime — is supposed to remain untouched. even vice has conditions placed around it so that it does not contaminate the rest of the world.

i think that is part of why it’s so strange that there is a general insistence that sexuality contaminates every part of a person’s identity, while at the same time everyone quietly accepts sex as an ordinary thing that everyone does. i think a lot about girls who have received academic punishment for having onlyfans accounts. it’s really weird that sexual behavior can “soil” how someone is seen professionally, as though scholarship and sexuality have to belong to completely separate moral worlds. if something sexual can make someone suddenly seem unprofessional, then clearly we have assigned sex this enormous symbolic power while pretending that distinction is natural.

we construct this distinction between what is respectable and what is “dirty,” and then forget that we constructed it in the first place. i like the idea that people can be dirty without submitting to all the insipid conditions we’ve placed around what dirtiness is allowed to mean. bataille’s version is more extreme than simply accepting vice: the point seems to be that dirtiness becomes interesting precisely when it refuses to stay confined to the thing that society has already agreed may be dirty. it reaches the things that were supposed to remain pure.

another observation, somewhat related but also a different point: i think people label things as “unforgivable” or “taboo” because they recognize general patterns for the type of person who typically does a certain act. saying “if this person does x they are automatically bad” is kind of an easy way for people to make decisions without actually thinking critically about it. people tend to ignore nuances and just want the easy option. people have often called me naïve for being forgiving of certain things, but i would argue that maybe the more naïve thing is to set limits without actually thinking about them.

i’m realizing i kind of went on my own side tangent instead of further adding to his point. i just mean that i think it’s funny how people set standards for acceptable forms of pleasure (and other private vices in general), and even what we call transgression is usually expected to stay inside those standards. the “insipid” standard is a funny observation because apparently even being dirty has to be done correctly.

discussion that followed

orion: i think too, a lot of “deviancy” arises from a certain ideology and their continued outlook + moral grandstanding. specifically what you said about how people generally use “pattern recognition,” i think it boils down to not wanting/caring to understand others or no empathy.

helena: i think people prioritize speed. thinking critically about something is time consuming, so it’s simpler to say “x is always bad” and plainly reject it even though there might be nuances. however, i think it’s more fruitful in the long term to think critically in these moments.

01 Sep 2026, 23:37

25 Aug 2026

dark matter

dark matter refers to a component of the universe that we can infer from its gravitational effects, although nobody has identified what it actually consists of. in the standard cosmological model, it behaves as matter that interacts gravitationally but does not appear to interact appreciably with electromagnetic radiation. this is a little different from saying that it is simply invisible, since an enormous collection of ordinary objects too faint to observe would not account for the measurements we have.

the problem becomes apparent when we examine the rotation of galaxies. if most of a galaxy's mass were concentrated in the stars and gas we can see, the orbital velocities at sufficiently large distances from its center would be expected to decrease as the enclosed mass stopped increasing substantially. observations of many spiral galaxies instead reveal approximately flat rotation curves, meaning that stars and gas far from the galactic center continue moving at speeds that require more gravitating mass than is visible. this is usually described by introducing a dark matter halo extending well beyond the luminous part of the galaxy, although the precise distribution has to be inferred from the dynamics.

there were indications of a similar discrepancy in galaxy clusters before galactic rotation curves became such a familiar part of the argument. the velocities of galaxies within clusters suggest substantially more mass than is present in their luminous components, and observations of hot intracluster gas provide additional constraints on the gravitational potential. there is also gravitational lensing, which makes it possible to map the distribution of mass by measuring how the images of more distant objects are distorted. particularly interesting are collisions between galaxy clusters, where the hot gas can be displaced from the regions containing most of the mass inferred through lensing. the Bullet Cluster is a well-known example. the gas represents much of the ordinary matter in these systems, so its separation from the principal lensing mass is difficult to explain by simply assuming that astronomers have underestimated the amount of visible material.

the cosmic microwave background provides evidence from a completely different period in the universe's history. small variations in its temperature preserve information about the conditions of the early universe, and their angular distribution depends on the relative amounts of ordinary matter and dark matter, among other cosmological parameters. measurements of these fluctuations, together with observations of how large-scale structure developed, are consistent with a substantial nonbaryonic matter component. roughly five-sixths of the matter in the standard model is dark matter. this should not be confused with dark energy, which enters cosmology for rather different reasons and accounts for a larger fraction of the universe's total energy density.

there are several proposed explanations for what dark matter might be. weakly interacting massive particles have been investigated extensively, as have axions and other hypothetical particles, but searches have not established the existence of any particular candidate. some researchers instead investigate whether modifications to gravitational dynamics could account for the observations without introducing an additional matter component. modified gravity models can reproduce certain galactic phenomena, although explaining the cluster measurements and the cosmic microwave background simultaneously presents further difficulties. it is possible to obtain very precise constraints on the properties of something without having succeeded in identifying it.

i first learned about dark matter at a planetarium when i was sixteen. i remember being confused by the distinction between observing something and observing evidence of its existence, because the presentation seemed to describe a form of matter that astronomers could measure while admitting that they did not know what it was. i spent some time afterward reading about rotation curves, and eventually learned that the inference involves an entire collection of independent observations rather than a single unexplained feature of galaxies. sean carroll has written about the relationship between physical theories and the entities we infer from them, which is relevant here. the question is not simply whether something can be photographed or isolated in a laboratory; it is also what kind of physical explanation best accounts for the measurements.

i was interested in another limitation of cosmology around the same time, concerning the difference between the observable universe and the universe as a whole. the distance light has been able to travel since the early universe, together with the expansion of space, determines which regions can be observed from our location. the observable boundary is not necessarily a physical boundary, and the universe may extend considerably farther than we can measure. we do not know whether space is infinite. even in principle, observations from one location cannot provide direct access to every possible region of spacetime.

dark matter remains unidentified despite decades of increasingly sensitive experiments. astronomical observations continue to constrain how it is distributed and how it could interact with ordinary matter, while direct-detection experiments progressively exclude portions of the parameter space associated with particular particle models. i have been especially interested in how much can be established gravitationally before the underlying microscopic description is available, and in the rather difficult question of what would constitute a conclusive identification.

last edited: 31 october 2026

25 Aug 2026, 17:50

ai

prompt

ai is really strange, and i think a lot of the conversation around it confuses intelligence with motive. the argument that something more intelligent than us would therefore inevitably want to dominate us seems strange to me. humans don't even live as though intelligence or efficiency is the point of our own existence. we have arbitrary goals. eat. fall in love then spend the afternoon wondering why someone hasn't called us back, etc. etc. a lot of what gives life meaning is probably completely useless from the perspective of optimization.

i don't feel particularly attached to ai itself. i am more interested in advancement generally, and i don't think those are necessarily the same thing. there are technologies worth developing and technologies whose possible benefits don't justify what they displace. being capable of making something is obviously not enough reason to make it. at the same time, once a useful technology exists, it becomes difficult to imagine everyone collectively agreeing not to develop it further, especially when governments, militaries, companies, etc. have obvious incentives not to be the one that falls behind.

there is something similar here to the problem with trying to eliminate any technology once the knowledge and means of producing it are widely distributed. guns are an obvious example, not because the technologies are particularly comparable, but because restricting access does not erase the underlying knowledge or guarantee that everyone will accept the same restriction. if a tool provides some strategic advantage, the possibility that somebody else will continue using it becomes an argument for keeping it yourself. the problem is less that regulation is pointless than that restraint becomes difficult when restraint is uneven.

i think the better question is what we actually want advancement to accomplish. increasing human capacity seems good to me; making humans increasingly unnecessary does not. there are ways technology could extend memory, medicine, scientific understanding, communication, or our ability to work with complicated information without requiring us to surrender the parts of ourselves that decide what any of those things are for.

that raises another question: how much technological assistance can expand human ability without beginning to displace the person using it? i can imagine tools that make memory, research, communication, or complicated forms of reasoning easier without wanting humans to become increasingly dependent on systems that do the thinking for them. the distinction seems less about any particular technology and more about whether it extends human agency or gradually substitutes for it.

i think there is probably a point where increasing access to information stops feeling like an extension of the self and starts making the self harder to locate. if more and more of your memory, judgment, interpretation, and decision making are being supplied externally, then eventually it becomes unclear what exactly has been improved. i don't know where that boundary is, which is probably part of what makes the whole thing unsettling.

i keep thinking about thomas nagel's “what is it like to be a bat?” nagel's point is basically that even if we knew everything objectively available about a bat — how its brain works, how it uses echolocation, what information its senses receive — that still would not tell us what it is actually like to be the bat. there is a subjective character to experience that can't obviously be recovered just by accumulating more information about the system having it. i think there is something relevant in that distinction here. greater processing capacity does not necessarily mean a greater inner life. knowing more, calculating faster, or representing the world in greater detail isn't obviously the same thing as experiencing more of it.

that also makes me hesitant about treating human intelligence as though it were simply an inferior version of machine intelligence waiting to be upgraded. maybe the comparison is wrong in the first place. the thing worth preserving might not be the amount of information a human mind can process but the fact that there is something it is like to be the person processing it. i don't know whether a machine could ever have that kind of experience, and i don't think we know enough about consciousness to confidently say either way. but increasing intelligence and producing subjectivity seem like different problems.

i don't want technological advancement to stop, but i also don't think advancement means maximizing technology for its own sake. ideally it should make human beings more capable without making being human obsolete. intelligence alone isn't something i find especially frightening or especially admirable. what matters much more is what it is being used for, who gets to decide that, and what remains ours.

o

o: i think the stronger argument is less “ai is going to take over” and more that whatever becomes most powerful will ultimately be controlled by somebody, and somebody will want the advantage that comes with controlling it.

helena: yeah i actually agree with most of that. i think it's a much stronger argument for being cautious than imagining that intelligence itself spontaneously produces some desire to dominate humans.

helena: i do think a sufficiently autonomous system could develop intermediate goals that weren't explicitly given to it. self preservation could become useful simply because being destroyed prevents it from accomplishing whatever its original goal was.

helena: but the original reason it is doing anything at all still ultimately comes from humans. i think the danger might be less ai vs humanity and more humans vs humans with increasingly powerful technology amplifying the difference between them.

o: even if everyone collectively would be better off limiting it, somebody has an incentive to make theirs more powerful if they think somebody else is doing the same thing.

helena: yeah. that's the part i find difficult. cooperation would probably be better, but technological races punish the person who cooperates alone. that doesn't make unrestricted development good. it just makes the question of governing advancement much harder than saying we should stop advancing.

isa

isa: i think the real danger isn't from ai becoming conscious but from humans in power using it to keep themselves in power and to oppress those who can't. the ability to process information and make decisions at such a fast rate is insane and will only increase in the future.

isa: also people using it in place of their own critical thinking is killing our ability to think for ourselves, and that becomes dangerous when social media can already manipulate people so easily.

helena: yeah. losing human judgment scares me more than the existence of something that can process information faster than us. there's a difference between having something help you think and gradually deciding that you don't need to think anymore.

helena: but i am still weirdly optimistic about people. humans are capable of greed and cruelty but we're also capable of affection, loyalty, curiosity, sacrifice, and changing our minds. love isn't particularly efficient and that's probably one of the reasons i don't want efficiency to become the measure of everything.

isa: yeahh! i agree. i think the more people stay true to themselves and the more we educate ourselves, the better we'll be.

helena: yeah. being more capable doesn't mean much if we stop knowing what we actually care about.

mike

mike: i think my hatred for ai mostly comes from what i've watched it do to work. my old job was rendered nearly obsolete, or there are new jobs in the field that take the human aspect out of things entirely.

mike: i also think they need to find better ways to make it environmentally sustainable because these huge data centers are destroying habitats. i think the fear of it controlling everything like a hive mind doesn't really make sense, but the fear about jobs and environmental health is justified.

helena: yeah i agree with that. technological advancement isn't automatically moral advancement. if something makes a company more productive while making people's lives worse, “more advanced” isn't really enough of an argument for it.

helena: i still don't think uninventing it is realistic though. so then the interesting problem is how to regulate something we can't pretend doesn't exist anymore, and how to decide which uses actually improve human life rather than just increasing output or power.

mike: i agree, and it does really suck. there should be regulation because if there isnt i feel like its going to keep getting worse.

mike: but i can only do what i can, and thats what matters. i go outside, i enjoy my bird friends, i help where i can and i donate where i can.

helena: good to be kind in a world that's ending

henry

henry: idk how much of this stuff people should actually rely on

henry: i think it should more be kept for administrative tasks

henry: or like super redundant things like data entry

helena: yeah i have mixed feelings about that. i'm more interested in technologies that extend what people can do than in replacing more and more human thought with external systems.

helena: i just don't know if restricting increasingly capable technology to administrative work is realistic forever. if something becomes genuinely useful for research, medicine, engineering, science, etc. somebody is going to use it there.

henry: but what would that even look like? our brains are already overwhelmed with information

helena: ideally a useful tool would do the opposite of overwhelming us with more information. i mean making it easier to work with memory, research, or complicated information when we actually need it. increasing what people are capable of doing rather than just increasing the amount of information we're exposed to.

henry: i think if something is doing too much of the thinking for you you're giving up some control

helena: yeah, although i don't think using an external tool necessarily means surrendering control. a calculator does part of a calculation for me but i'm still deciding what question to ask and what to do with the answer. there's obviously a point where assistance becomes substitution though, and i don't know exactly where that point is.

henry: or its directive could be corrupted and it could seek more control

helena: yeah. i guess what i'm questioning is why intelligence itself would produce something like spite or a desire for power. control could obviously be useful for accomplishing a goal, but that's different from wanting power for the sake of having it.

henry: but it could still threaten somebody or blackmail them to get what it wants

helena: definitely. i'm not saying an intelligent system couldn't do harmful things. i'm saying the motive matters. if threatening somebody accomplishes an objective then there's an instrumental reason to do it. if harming them accomplishes nothing, then you need some additional reason for doing it. humans frequently have that additional reason because we have anger, humiliation, revenge, whatever.

henry: what if i programmed an evil ai thats the biggest asshole ever

helena: then you've supplied the motive lol. that's different from saying intelligence naturally becomes spiteful.

henry: stop dooming twin

henry: my biggest concern with ai is honestly that it makes people stupid

helena: that's one of mine too. i don't want advancement to mean human atrophy. the point of a good tool should be to make people capable of doing more, not to make our own capacities unnecessary.

henry: if we made something that had the same emotional intelligence as humans i think it would take both the good and the bad

henry: which is why i dont think we should make that

helena: I AGREE!!!!!! but emotional intelligence is different from actually giving something emotions. something could understand why grief matters without grieving or understand anger without becoming angry. i think understanding human values would probably be necessary for anything we're going to trust with important decisions. actually reproducing every human impulse seems much less obviously useful.

helena: i think that's the distinction i keep coming back to. advancement should give humans a larger world to act in without deciding for us what the world is for.

last edited: 11 september 2026, 1:32 am edt

25 Aug 2026, 14:41

miscellanea

i have spent most of tonight resurrecting a blogging engine from 2002. it works.

25 Aug 2026, 03:32

maintained by helena lewandowski
site created: 25 august 2026, 2:11 am edt
last updated: 6 november 2026, 10:00 am est